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THE PROBLEM OF NONREVIEWABILITY: JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF ACTION COMMITTED TO
AGENCY DISCRETION*
STEPHEN PAUL MAHINKAI.

INTRODUCTION

IN RECENT YEARS, changes in both the scope and the scale of
governmental programs have resulted in a vast growth and increased
presence of administration. The noted political scientist Theodore Lowi
has observed that "modern law has become a series of instructions to
administrators rather than a series of commands to citizens."' In such
a situation, the problem becomes "how to be certain he [the citizen]
' 2
remains a citizen.
A prime method for control of administration is judicial review of
allegedly unauthorized agency action. In recent years, recognition of the
importance of such control to those administered has been a major
factor leading to the emergence of a presumption of reviewability of
agency action. However, the propriety of judicial review where action
is committed to the discretion of the agency remains a subject of controversy in the courts, 3 and of debate among the commentators. 4
* The author wishes to express his appreciation to Professor Clark Byse of the
Harvard Law School for his comments and suggestions.
t Member of the Pennsylvania Bar. Law Clerk to the Hon. Allan M. Hale,
Chief Justice, Massachusetts Appeals Court. A.B., The Johns Hopkins University,
1971; J.D., Harvard University, 1974.
1. T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM 144 (1969).
2. Id. A provocative discussion of this problem may be found in Reich, The Law
of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1227 (1966).
3. See Northeast Community Org., Inc. v. Weinberger, 378 F. Supp. 1287 (D.
Md. 1974), where the court noted that "the preliminary question of the propriety of
judicial review over acts committed to agency discretion within the meaning of"
section 10 of the APA "is a subject of intense dispute between the Circuits ....
Id. at 1292. For recent decisions denying review, see notes 40, 41, 115 & 195 infra.
4. See, e.g., Note, Reviewability of Administrative Action: The Elusive Search
for a Pragmatic Standard, 1974 DUKE L.J. 382, where the author wrote: "It is clear
that, if action is committed exclusively to agency discretion, the exercise of that
discretion is not subject to judicial review." Id. at 387. The cases relied upon are
Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line, Inc., 356 U.S. 309 (1958), and Ferry v. Udall, 336
F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 904 (1965). For criticism of these
decisions, see text accompanying notes 34-62 infra.
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This article advances the proposition that a person is entitled to
judicial review of administrative action relating to his legally recognized interests except when the action which interferes with such
interests is justified by a grant of valid authority.
Accordingly, a grant of broad discretion should not be held to
foreclose all review of an agency's actions. The question of reviewability should be determined in each particular case, considering not
only factors which militate against review, such as possible administrative inconvenience, but also the oft-ignored countervailing, positive
factors which contribute to the effective and legitimate functioning of
the administrative process.

II.

NONREVIEWABILITY

A.

As A

THRESHOLD DETERMINATION

Discretion and the Administrative Procedure Act

In determining the reviewability of discretionary administrative
action, sections 10, 10(a),' and 10(e) 7 of the Administrative Procedure Act' (APA) are most relevant.
The prime source of controversy in this area has been the result of
the ambiguous statutory directive mandated by that portion of section
10(2), which states that judicial review is available except to the
extent that "agency action is committed to agency discretion by law,"
5. Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1970), provides
in part:
This chapter applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent
that(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or
(2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.
Id.
6. Administrative Procedure Act § 10(a), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970), provides:
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected
or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.
Id.
7. Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970), provides
in part:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency
action. The reviewing court shall(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found
to be(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or
short of statutory right;
(D)

without observance of procedure required by law

...

Id.
8. Section 10, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1970).
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and section 10(e) (B) (1), which instructs the reviewing court to set
aside agency action found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 9 Conflicting interpretations have been proposed in an attempt to reconcile the withdrawal
from judicial scrutiny of discretionary agency action in section 10, with
the mandatory judicial review for abuse of that discretion in section 10
(e) (B) (1) - the first principally by Professor Davis1" and Harvey
Saferstein," and the second principally by Professors Jaffe 2 and
3
Berger.1

Professor Davis' reconciliation of these two sections is premised
upon the argument that:
[E]mphasis should be put on the word "committed." Action
"committed" to agency discretion by law is that action which is
so far committed as not to be reviewable, and agency action which
is not so far committed is reviewable. The two concepts "committed to agency discretion" and "unreviewable" have in this
limited context the same meaning. 4
Thus, Professor Davis suggests that if the court were to find that
Congress committed the decision to agency discretion by law, "then a
reviewing court can afford no review, not even for abuse of discretion. ' 19. Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e) (B) (1), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (1970).
10. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (Supp. 1970) [hereinafter cited
as DAVIS, TREATISE]; K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT (3d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as DAVIS, TEXT]; Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness - A Final Word,
114 U. PA. L. REV. 814 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Davis, Final Word]; Davis,
Administrative Arbitrariness- A Postscript, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 823 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Davis, Postscript]; Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness is Not Always
Reviewable, 51 MINN. L. REV. 643 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Davis, Not Always
Reviewable].
11. Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to
Agency Discretion," 82 HARV. L. REv. 367 (1968).

12. L.

JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

(abr. student ed.

1965) [hereinafter cited as JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL]; Jaffe, The Right to Judicial
Review (pts. 1 & 2), 71 HARV. L. REV. 401, 769 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Jaffe,
Judicial Review].
13. Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 COLUM. L.
REV. 55 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Berger, Judicial Review] ; Berger, Administrative
Arbitrariness- A Reply to Professor Davis, 114 U. PA. ,. REV. 783 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Berger, Reply] ; Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness - A Rejoinder
to Professor Davis' "Final Word," 114 U. PA. L. REV. 816 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as Berger, Rejoinder] ; Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A Sequel, 51 MINN.
L. REV. 601 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Berger, Sequel]; Berger, Administrative
Arbitrariness: A Synthesis, 78 YALE L.J. 965 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Berger,
Synthesis].
14. DAVIS, TEXT, supra note 10, § 28.05, at 515. See also DAVIS, TREATISE, supra
note 10, § 28.16, at 965. Contra, JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL, supra note 12, at 375.
15. Littell v. Morton, 445 F.2d 1207, 1211 (4th Cir. 1971), citing DAVIS, TTEATISE,
supra note 10, § 28.16, at 80. The Littell court, however, expressly adopted the
Published
by Villanova
University445
Charles
School of Law Digital Repository, 1974
Jaffe-Berger
rationale.
F.2d Widger
at 1211.
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Saferstein also has adopted this position, 1 6 noting that the APA "only
codified the already existing doctrine that in appropriate circumstances
the courts would not as a matter of propriety and efficiency inquire
1

into certain abuses."' 1

Upon the other hand, Professor Jaffe has argued that despite the
existence of discretion, a court normally still "will review an agency's

choice in order to determine whether it is within the permissible class
of actions."' 8 Professor Berger, in the course of his lengthy exchange
with Professor Davis, has contended that the APA explicitly directs the
courts to review all claims of abuse of discretion, and thus he espouses
a position beyond Professor Jaffe's. Referring to section 10(2)'s excepting provisions, Professor Berger argues that "only the exercise
of 'sound discretion' was sheltered by the second exception; the directive
to set arbitrariness aside was left untouched." 19
Any judicial consideration of a claimed abuse of agency discretion
will of necessity be affected by a reviewing court's acceptance of one of
the foregoing interpretations over another. The Davis-Saferstein position precludes judicial review if the administrative action is determined
to be an inappropriate subject for judicial review, thus insulating from
scrutiny action allegedly an abuse of the discretion delegated to the
agency. Conversely, Professor Berger would require the court to review
all allegations of arbitrariness upon the part of the agency, while Professor Jaffe alludes more directly to the authority of the agency and
its permissible range of choice. Professor Jaffe's position appears most
sensitive to the problem of reconciling the need of the aggrieved individual for some measure of control over (or perhaps validation of)
discretionary action, with the authority of the agency to take action
conferred upon it by Congress to meet some public purpose.
This article submits that the aforementioned problem of statutory
interpretation is best approached not by asking whether the particular
action is of a type "intrinsically unsuited"2 ° to review, or whether the
action could be characterized as arbitrary in some sense, but rather by
looking to the statutory authority under which the action was taken.
This solution is particularly appropriate given the concept of "discretion" itself. Professor Jaffe has defined discretion as "the power
16. Id.
17. Saferstein, supra note 11, at 374 n.33. See id. at 374 & nn.32-33.
18. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL, supra note 12, at 359. See also id. at 264-65;
Jaffe, Judicial Review, supra note 12, at 774. While Jaffe acknowledges that abuses
of discretion will normally be judicially reviewable, he does concede that there will
be instances in which the "character" of the power granted or the "terms" of its
grant may imply absolute discretion. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL, supra note 12, at 360.
19. Berger, Synthesis, supra note 13, at 980. Cf. id. at 970, 999. See also Berger,
Reply, supra note 13, at 788.
20. Davis, Final Word, supra note 10, at 815.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/1
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of the administrator to make a choice from among two or more legally
valid solutions,"' 21 solutions within the "permissible class of actions." 22
Similarly, the legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin has noted:
[T]he concept of discretion is at home in only one sort of context:
when someone is in general charged with making decisions subject
to standards set by a particular authority ....
Discretion, like the
hole in a doughnut, does not exist except as an area left open by a
surrounding belt of restriction ....
].t always makes sense to
ask, "Discretion under which standards?" or "Discretion as to
which authority ?,23
The approach urged herein, contrary to that espoused by Professor
Berger, is that arbitrary decision would be allowed in either of two
situations: (1) where the statute specifically provided for it - for
example, by allowing random selection as a method of choice - or (2)
by providing no standards at all against which the permissibility of the
choice under the statute might be judged.
Conversely, contrary to Professor Davis and Saferstein, only in
the above two situations, or, of course, in a case in which the applicable
statute precluded review expressly or by implication, "4 would a petitioner be denied judicial review for a prima facie allegation of abuse
25
of agency discretion.
The leading case interpreting section 10's exceptions, Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,"' apparently adopted this approach, limiting the exception from judicial review of action "committed to agency discretion" to those "rare instances" where there is
21. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL, supra note 12, at 586.
22. Id. at 359. For a similar conception as to the nature of discretion, see Drucker
v. United States, 498 F.2d 1350, 1352 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
23. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 32 (1967).
24. See Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 167 (1970); Switchmen's Union v.
National Med. Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943) ; City of Philadelphia v. Baker, 508 F.2d 279,
282 (3d Cir. 1975) ; de Rodulfa v. United States, 461 F.2d 1240, 1244-50 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949 (1972). Cf. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National
Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 457-62, 464-65 (1974). See generally Hart,
The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in
Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362 (1953).

25. This last phrase indicates that the bare assertion of abuse of discretion, without more, will often be insufficient as a basis for judicial review. See Mulloy v.
United States, 398 U.S. 410 (1970), where the Court stated:
Since the petitioner presented a non-frivolous, prima facie claim for a change in
classification based on new factual allegations which were not conclusively refuted
by other information in his file, it was an abuse of discretion by the [selective
service] board not to reopen his classification ....
Id. at 418. See also Scanwell Lab. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
13 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 408, 416 (1971).
26. 401 University
U.S. 402 Charles
(1971). Widger
See discussion
of text
accompanying
notes 128-35 infra.
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and therefore no standard by which to distinguish
the reasonable from the arbitrary decision.
Thus, there will be situations involving arbitrary agency actions
which will not constitute abuses of discretion. Nonetheless, as Overton
Park makes clear, this is to be a very narrow exception. A penetrating
discussion may be found in an earlier case, Wong Wing Hang v.
Immigration and Naturalization Service,2 wherein Judge Henry
Friendly stated:
Some help in resolving the seeming contradiction [between sections
10 and 10(e)] may be afforded by the distinction drawn by
Professors Hart and Sacks between a discretion that "is not subject to the restraint of the obligation of reasoned decision . . ."
and discretion of the contrary and more usual sort; only in the
rare - some say non-existent - case where discretion of the
former type has been vested, may review for "abuse" be precluded.29
As Saferstein noted, "since this sort of discretion would rarely be conferred, the doctrine [of "committed to agency discretion"] on the
Friendly reading would almost never be invoked to bar review.""0
Saferstein and Professor Davis, however, see a broader role for
the exception of action committed to agency discretion; the latter, particularly, has attempted to show that the existence of the broad discretion within the statutory mandate of an agency will serve to preclude
review. However, this position seems to have been rejected in the most
recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and the
lower federal courts.
B.

The Existence of Discretion as Not Precluding Review

Professor Davis finds some support for his wider view of "unreviewable administrative action" in the fact that many statutes are
27. Id. at 410. An example of the "no law to apply" situation is Hi-Ridge Lumber
Co. v. United States, 443 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1971), where the Ninth Circuit held that
a decision by the Secretary of Agriculture that all bids for a contract for the sale of
timber would be rejected was within the ambit of those decisions removed from
judicial review upon the merits by the APA as action committed to agency discretion.
Id. at 456. The court distinguished the case factually from Overton Park by noting
that there, "the Supreme Court [had] found the statute involved contained specific
requirements to guide and control agency action," whereas in Hi-Ridge "we have no
standards before us by which we could review the rejection of all bids." Id. at 455-56.
Accord, Kendler v. Wirtz, 388 F.2d 381, 383 (3d Cir. 1968); Sergeant v. Fudge,
238 F.2d 917, 918 (6th Cir. 1956); Corace v. Butterfield, 387 F. Supp. 446, 447-48
(E.D.N.Y. 1975); Community Nat'l Bank v. Gidney, 192 F. Supp. 514, 518 (E.D.
Mich. 1961), aff'd as modified, 310 F.2d 224 (6th Cir. 1962). See The Supreme Court,
1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 40, 317 n.19 (1971).

28. 360 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1966).
29. Id. at 718 (citations omitted), quoting H.M.

HART

& A.

SACKS, THE LEGAL

PROCESS 172, 175-77 (Tent. ed. 1958).

30. Saferstein, supra note 11, at 375 n.36.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/1
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couched in permissive (the agency "may act") rather than in mandatory terms (the agency "shall act"). In Ferry v. Udall, 1 a case upon
which he heavily relies, the Ninth Circuit distinguished between decisions committed to an agency's discretion pursuant to a permissivetype statute, which it held not to be reviewable, and decisions pursuant
to a mandatory-type statute, whereby there could be judicial review
even though some degree of discretion was involved. 2 Additionally,
he relies upon the Supreme Court's decision in Panama Canal Co. v.
Grace Line, Inc., 3 wherein the Court held that toll rates set by the
Panama Canal Company were not subject to judicial review because
rate adjustment was a matter left to the discretion of the company; 4 and
Hamel v. Nelson, 5 wherein a district court, relying upon his Treatise," '
held that the denial of a patent was not reviewable. The court concluded
that it was a case involving agency action committed by law to agency
discretion, and that "the general rule is that such agency action is not
judicially reviewable." 8
While the reasoning in Ferry, Panama Canal, and Hamel is still
occasionally applied,88 this view of the scope of the committed-to-agency31. 336 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 904 (1965). Davis re-

fers to Ferry as "a well-considered and especially instructive case." DAvis, TREATISE,
supra note 10, § 28.16, at 968. But see Berger, Reply, supra note 13, at 799-803, for
an extended criticism of Ferry.
32. Id. at 712. Accord. e.g., United States v. Walker, 409 F.2d 477, 480 (9th
Cir. 1969). The decision in Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970), undermined
the conclusiveness of the "permissive-mandatory" distinction of Ferry and Walker
as the basis for precluding judicial review. See also Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d
567, 570 (9th Cir. 1971).
33. 356 U.S. 309 (1958).
34. Id. at 317. Judge Friendly has referred to Panama Canal as an "inscrutable
opinion." Langevin v. Chenango Court, Inc., 447 F.2d 296, 303 (2d Cir. 1971). See
also .Burns v. United States Postal Serv., 380 F. Supp. 623, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
35. 226 F. Supp. 96 (N.D. Cal. 1963).
36. See note 10 supra.
37. Id. at 98. The district court's conclusion that this case involved agency
action committed by law solely to agency discretion was founded upon the permissivemandatory distinction. Id. But see Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970).
The district court also stated that "agency action which merely denies a
governmental benefit," rather than a vested property right, "may more properly be
held not reviewable." 226 F. Supp. at 99. While the Hamel Court noted that the
general rule of nonreviewability of action committed by law to agency discretion was
qualified by the allowance of limited review for- fundamental jurisdictional or constitutional issues, id. at 98, this so-called right-privilege (benefit) distinction has been
rejected as a basis for determining constitutional rights, and thereby puts into question its weight as a factor in Hamel. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481
(1972); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971). See also W. GELLHORN
& C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW xi (5th ed. 1970); Van Alstyne, The Demise of
the Right-Privilege-Distinctionin Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
38. See Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 395 F.2d 353, 358 (6th Cir.
1968). Accord, Sugarman v. Forbragd, 267 F. Supp. 817 (N.D. Cal. 1967), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 960 (1969), where the court, relying upon Panama Canal, Ferry and Hamel,
held by
that
the determination
of theWidger
admissibility
offered
for import
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discretion exception is not a compelling one, nor has it been accepted
in many recent cases. 9
...
.,
Professor Jaffe has argued, contrary to Professor Davis, that
"the mere presence of agency discretion does not- oust review"4 and
"should not bar a court from considering a claim of illegal or arbitrary
use of discretion."'" Since an agency action "may be set aside for 'an
mitted by law to the discretion of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare,
and accordingly was not reviewable under the APA. Id. at 822-23. See also Government Employees Local 2764 v. General Serv. Admin., 348 F. Supp. 1200 (W.D. Pa.
1972), a poorly considered, two-page memorandum opinion quoting Panama Canal
in dismissing an action to enjoin the relocation of federal offices in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, since the relocation was an action committed to agency discretion by law.
However, there were Presidential directives concerning efficiency and lowest possible
cost available as potential guidelines for review.
See also Schneider v. Richardson, 441 F.2d 1320 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 872 (1971), holding that "the setting of fees for representatives of claimants
before the Secretary [of HEW] is committed to that agency's discretion . . . and
judicial review is therefore precluded by [section 10] of the APA .

. . ."

Id. at 1321.

Contra, Littell v. Morton, 445 F.2d 1207, 1211 (4th Cir. 1971); DAVIs, TREATISE,
supra note 10, § 28.16, at 979-80.
More recently, the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. One 1970 Buick Riviera,
463 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 980 (1972), held that the Attorney
General had unreviewable discretion concerning a *bank's claim for remission of a
forfeiture of an automobile, citing the "long-standing, judge-made rule" to that
effect, but relying upon cases no more recent than United States v. One 1961
Cadillac, 337 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1964). The court stated:
Although we recognize that agency action is unreviewable only in the exceptional
case . . . we do not write upon a clean slate. We find no instance where the
Attorney General's discretion was subjected to judicial review; the full weight
of authority lies on the other side.
463 F.2d at 1171 n.4 (citations omitted).
Commenting upon Buick Riviera, Professor Schwartz has noted, "[t]he
decision is anomalous in view of the recent tendency to expand the availability of
review. To make remission or mitigation action nonreviewable is to place the judicial
imprimatur upon a tendency to use remission and mitigation authority as a virtual
substantive power." Schwartz, Administrative Law Cases During 1972, 25 AD. L.
REv. 97, 107 (1973).
39. The most recent decision upholding a restricted view of reviewability is
Action on Safety & Health v. FTC, 498 F.2d 757 (D.C. Cir. 1974), where the court
held that a decision to deny intervention in a consent negotiation to a consumer protection organization was an agency action committed to agency discretion and therefore exempt from judicial review. Id. at 762-63.
The court dealt with the question of reviewability in a summary fashion,
failing to consider the more recent cases in the area, including those decided by the
District of Columbia Circuit. See notes 62-67 infra. The court instead chose to rely
upon Professor Davis' treatise, Panama Canal, and Curran v. Laird, 420 F.2d 122
(D.C. Cir. 1969), discussed at notes 148-50 and accompanying text infra. 498 F.2d
at 761. Judge Tamm, writing for the court, attempted to buttress his position by
-noting that "[tlhis analysis has been adopted by other courts." Id. at 761 n.8. How-ever, he cited only Ferry v. Udall, ignoring the apparent abandonment of that position
Fey the Ninth Circuit 7 years after Ferry, in Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567, 570
.(9th Cir. 1971). See notes 60 & 61 and accompanying text infra. He also neglected
the considerable authority opposed to his position in other circuits. See notes 68-75
tinfra. It should also be noted that possible positive effects of judicial review, such
as those tentatively outlined below, were not considered by the court. See the discussion in III (1) infra.
40. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL, supra note 12, at 374.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/1
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abuse of discretion,' " this "clearly implies reviewability despite the
presence of discretion."42 Jaffe has concluded that "[p]resumptively, an
exercise of discretion is reviewable for legal error, procedural defect,
or, abuse.' ""

Saferstein has disagreed with this interpretation of the APA,
which finds a presumption of reviewability, stating that "contrary to
the general presumption for review, the [committed-to-agency-discretion] doctrine expresses a general presumption against review." 44
4"
Beginning with its decision in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,
the Supreme Court has explicitly adopted the Jaffe position. There, the
Court, in an opinion by Justice Harlan, stated that "judicial review of
a final agency action will not be cut off unless there is a persuasive
reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress," 46 citing the
statement in Rusk v. CortT that "only upon a showing of 'clear and

convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent should the courts
'4 8
restrict access to judicial review."

Three years later, in Association of Data Processing Service
Organizations,Inc. v. Camp,49 the Court held that "[t]here is no presumption against judicial review and in favor of administrative absolutism . . . unless that purpose is fairly discernible in the statutory

scheme." 5 The same day, in deciding Barlow v. Collins,51 Justice
Douglas stated:
[P]reclusion of judicial review of administrative action adjudicating private rights is not lightly to be inferred .... Indeed, judicial

review of such administrative action is the rule. and nonreviewability an exception which must be demonstrated. 52
42. Id. at 374. Accord, Bell Lines, Inc. v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 209, 213'
(S.D. W. Va. 1969), aff'd, 397 U.S. 818 (1970).
43. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL, supra note 12, at 363. "The Administrative Procedure Act has . . .the merit of codifying the presumption of reviewability." Id. at
372. Cf. Berger, Reply, supra note 13, at 788.
44. Saferstein, supra note 11, at 370.
45. 387 U.S. 136, 140-44 (1967).
46. Id. at 140. Accord. Cappadora v.Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 1,6 (2d Cir. 1966).
47. 369 U.S. 367, 379-80 (1962).
48. 387 U.S. at 141; the Court also cited JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL, supra note.
12, at 336-59. For three recent cases, illustrating the requirement that a statute must
evince a clear and convincing legislative intent inorder to insulate final agency actionfrom judicial review, see Hayes Int'l Corp. v. McLucas, 509 F.2d 247, 258-60 (5th
Cir. 1975); New Jersey Chap., Inc., American Phys. Therapy Ass'n v. Prudential'
Life Ins. Co. of America, 502 F.2d 500, 504 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Kingsbrook Jewish.
Med. Center v. Richardson, 486 F.2d 663, 667-68 (2d Cir. 1973).
49. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
50. Id. at 157 (citations omitted).
51. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
52. Id. at 166 (citations omitted). For the lower federal courts' application of
this directive, see Consolidated-Tomoka Land Co. v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1208, 1209 (5th,
Cir.
1974) ; Clark
v. United
F.2dof 586,
590 (8th
Cir. 1973).
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Notwithstanding the clear import of the above opinions, Professor
Davis has argued that the language quoted with approval in Data
Processing (that there must be "clear and convincing evidence" of a
legislative intent to withhold judicial review) "is not and never has
been a reliable guide to Supreme Court holdings; the dictum is contrary
to holding and therefore is not the law."53 However, the only cases that
5
are discussed by Professor Davis are dated 1960" and 1965," both
prior to the clear and reiterated statement of the presumption'of reviewability by the Court.5"
In the specific context of the reviewability of action committed
to agency discretion, Professor Davis' continued reliance upon Ferry
v. Udall seems misplaced.5 7 In Mulloy v. United States,5 8 the Supreme
Court, dealing with a Selective Service Board's refusal to reopen a
registrant's classification, stated:
Though the language of [the regulation] is permissive, it does
not follow that a board may arbitrarily refuse to reopen a registrant's classification.59
This approach by the Court has been followed in virtually all recent
decisions by the lower federal courts, including the Ninth Circuit, which
decided Ferry v. Udall. Reversing its presumption in Ferry, the court
stated in Rockbridge v. Lincoln ° :
A permissive statutory term . ..is not by itself to be read as a

congressional command precluding judicial review. The question
is whether nonreviewability can fairly be inferred from the overall statutory scheme. 61
supra note 10, § 2803, at 512. See also id. § 28.04, at 513;
TREATISE, supra note 10, § 28.08, at 947.
54. Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666 (1960).
55. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Association for the Benefit of Non-Contract
Employees, 380 U.S. 650 (1965). Professors Gellhorn and Byse consider this opinion
to deal "more with the scope than with preclusion of review." W. GELLHORN & C.
BYsE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 219 n.3 (6th ed. 1974) (emphasis in original).
56. Cf. Comment, Judicial Control of Administrative Inaction: Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 57 VA. L. REV. 676 (1971), where the author
wrote:
The emergence of the presumption of reviewability in Abbott Laboratories
was not an isolated event. It reflected a new approach to the formulation of concepts about the judicial review of administrative conduct and the effects of the
53. DAVIS,

TEXT,

§ 28.07, at 524; DAVIS,

transformation have been evident elsewhere .... [A] similar development in the

law of standing has enlarged the class of plaintiffs who may seek review.
Id. at 692 (citations omitted).
57. DAVIS, TEXT, supra note 10, § 28.05, at 515.
58. 398 U.S. 410 (1970).
59. Id. at 415. Cf. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958); SEC v. Chenery,
332 U.S. 194, 208 (1947).
60. 449 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1971).
61. Id. at 570. The court cited Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970), as
authority. 449 F.2d at 570. See also National Forest Pres. Group v. Butz, 485 F.2d
408 (9th Cir. 1973), where the court held that the discretionary authority of the
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/1
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The District of Columbia Circuit, in a series of important decisions
in disparate contexts, has strongly reinforced the presumption of reviewability notwithstanding the presence of permissive statutory language. In reviewing government procurement procedures and regulations in Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer,62 the court held that
"where, as here, a prima facie showing of illegality is made, the question
is uniquely appropriate for judicial determination; a plea that such
actions are reserved to agency discretion will not be allowed to deny

review. ' '63 In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin,4 a suit

to compel the Secretary of Agriculture to suspend the use of DDT,

the court stated that evidence of a legislative intent to preclude judicial
review of administrative action "cannot be found by the mere fact that
the statute is directed in permissive rather than mandatory terms.""
6
Further, in Peoples v. United States Department of Agriculture,"
Judge Leventhal stated:
Our decision was made in the context of the general rule,
subject only to rare exceptions, that the action of a government
agency in the domestic sphere .

.

. is subject to judicial review for

arbitrariness and
abuse of discretion, even though that discretion
6T
may be broad.

The Fourth Circuit is in agreement with the position of the District
of Columbia Circuit. In a thoughtful and instructive opinion for the
court in Littell v. Morton,6 s Judge Winter concluded that, while the
Secretary of Agriculture to enter into land exchanges was nonetheless reviewable
as to specific questions, including compliance with statutory limitations as to authority.

Id. at 411.
62. 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
63. Id. at 875. A different result was reached by the court in Wheelabrator Corp.
v. Chafee, 455 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1971), where it was held that plaintiff had failed
to make out a prima facie case of agency illegality. Id. at 1309.

64. 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
65. Id. at 1098. Cf. Note, Non-Reviewability of Emergency Suspension Powers
under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Radenticide Act: Nor-Am Agr. Prod.,
Inc. v. Hardin, 46 IND. L.J. 238, 253-54 (1971), noting that the court in the Nor-Am
decision precluded complete insulation from review.
66. 427 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
67. Id. at 567. Other District of Columbia Circuit opinions in accord include
Overseas Media v. McNamara, 385 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir. 1967), where Judge McGowan
noted:
Appellee apparently would have us adopt the view that the act of committing a matter to an agency's discretion forecloses court consideration of an
alleged abuse of discretion. The legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act belies this position.
Id. at 316-17 n.14. See also National Auto. Laund. & Clean. Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d
689, 694-95 (D.C. Cir. 1971); and, most recently, Independent Brokers Ass'n of
America v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 500 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
where the court held that "the use of permissive language, 'may' in this case, is not
sufficient" to establish congressional intent to preclude review. Id. at 814.
68. 445 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1971).
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statute committed the decision to deny compensation to an Indian
attorney for professional services rendered an Indian tribe to the
discretion of the Secretary of the Interior, the "APA provides limited
0'
judicial review to determine if there was an abuse of that discretion." 9
An earlier opinion of the Eighth Circuit, Webster Groves Trust
Co. v. Saxon,70 is also in accord with the above decisions. There, the
court held that although the Comptroller is "free to exercise his discretion in the granting of charters," if he acts in "abuse of his legal
authority, to this extent his actions are subject to judicial review .
"...71
The Eighth Circuit has continued to adhere to this view, most recently
in Ratnayake v. Mack,7 2 where a discretionary grant or denial of labor
certification by the Secretary of Labor under the Immigration and
Naturalization Act was held judicially reviewable, relying upon Overton
Park and Barlow as authority. 73 The court found sufficient "law to
apply" in the factors which were required to be considered when the
Secretary was preparing to rule upon a labor certification, and therefore
' 71
his determination was not "committed to agency discretion by law."
In a similar case involving alien employment certifications, Secretary of
Labor v. Farino,75 the Seventh Circuit also held that the exception from
review for action committed to agency discretion was inapplicable.
Several decisions in the federal district courts as well have rejected the
view that judicial review is precluded if broad discretion has been committed to the agency.

77

69. Id. at 1211. See Appalachian Pwr. Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973),
where the court noted that "while an agency may have the discretion to decide,"
such discretion "does not include a right to act perfunctorily or arbitrarily ...
Id. at 507, quoting Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1138 (4th Cir. 1971).
70. 370 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1966).
71. Id. at 388.
72. 499 F.2d 1207 (8th Cir. 1974).
73. Id. at 1210.
74. Id. See Sioux Valley Empire Elec. Ass'n v. Butz, 504 F.2d 168 (8th Cir.
1974), where the court found "law to apply" in rejecting the argument of the Rural
Electrification Administration that its decision to withhold funds was committed to
agency discretion and hence "one inappropriate for judicial review." Id. at 172-73.
75. 490 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1973).
76. Id. at 888-89, citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402 (1971). Accord, Yong v. Regional Manpower Adm'r, 509 F.2d 243, 245-46
(9th Cir. 1975) ; Pesikoff v. Secretary of Labor, 501 F.2d 757, 760 n.3 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 525 (1974) ; Digilab, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 495 F.2d 323,
326-27 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 840 (1974); Reddy, Inc. v. United States
Dep't of Labor, 492 F.2d 538, 543-44 (5th Cir. 1974). Cf. Kingsbrook Jewish Med.
Center v. Richardson, 486 F.2d 663, 667-68 (2d Cir. 1973).
77. See Ozbirman v. Regional Manpwr. Adm'r, 335 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y.
1971), where the court, in actions by aliens seeking reversal of denials of employment certification, acknowledged that the ultimate decision as to whether there had
been an "adverse effect" or "sufficient workers" was committed to the discretion of
the Secretary of Labor, but went on to state that "such discretion does not immunize
administrative action from judicial review when, for example, there has been an
abuse of discretion." Id. at 470 (citation omitted). See Poirrier v. St. James Parish
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/1
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The foregoing cases demonstrate that there now exists a presumption of reviewability under the APA, and that even delegation of
broad discretion to an agency (so long as there are some standards
under which a court can meaningfully undertake review) does not
preclude review. Yet, it has been asserted that regardless of the presence
of standards under which a court may review discretionary activity,
certain "areas" or "matters" remain unreviewable, even for abuse of
discretion, and that a threshold determination should be made as to
whether the matter is suitable for review.
C.

The Rejection of Nonreviewability as a
Threshold Determination

Professor Davis has argued that "under [section 10] of the
Administrative Procedure Act, some discretion is reviewable and some
is not" ' and therefore, "[a] case within the area of review is reviewable, and one outside the area of review is unreviewable."79 A case
outside the area of review would be one which is "intrinsically unsuited to judicial review." ' According to him, these areas of nonreviewability exist where either "(a) congressional intent is discernible to
make it unreviewable, or (b) the subject matter is for some reason
inappropriate for judicial consideration.""
To the extent that (a) above means that intent is discernible in
the statute to preclude judicial jurisdiction over the agency action, it
would seem better assimilated to the exception of section 10(1) for
statutes precluding judicial review than the section 10 (2) exception for
action committed to agency discretion ;82 while (b) above suggests that
Police Jury, 372 F. Supp. 1021, 1023 (E.D. La. 1974) ; Western Add'n Community
Org. v. Weaver, 294 F. Supp. 433, 442-43 (N.D. Cal. 1968); Suwanee S.S. Co. v.

United States, 354 F. Supp. 1361 (Cust. Ct. 1973), where the Customs Court, in

rejecting the claim of the Secretary of the Treasury that his authority to remit
customs duties was entirely discretionary and not subject to review in any court,
held that even where action is committed to agency discretion, the court would review
to determine whether there had been an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1369. The court
further noted that "[rleliance upon the 'permissive versus mandatory' test for reviewability purposes has been all but done away with in the Second Circuit . . . and is
fast being laid to rest by other federal circuits." Id. at 1368 (citation omitted).
78. Davis, Final Word, supra note 10, at 814. See also Davis, Not Always

Reviewable, supra note 10, at 643.
79. DAVIS, TEXT, supra note 10, § 28.01, at 509 (emphasis added).
80. Davis, Final Word, supra note 10, at 815. For a discussion of various techniques to control the exercise of discretion by means other than judicial review, see
Jowell, The Legal Control of Administrative Discretion, 1973 PUB. L. 178, where
the author observed that "there has been little attempt to analyse why law cannot
control certain kinds of problems, and to characterise the nature of problems that are
(and are not) amenable to legal control." Id.
For one of the few efforts at such analysis see the insightful discussion in
Fuller, Mediation - Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. Rav. 305 (1971).
81. DAvis, TREATISE, supra note 10, § 28.16, at 965 (emphasis added).
Published by Villanova
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an inappropriate subject matter could be precluded from review even if
there were abuse of agency discretion.8"
Saferstein speaks explicitly of "the threshold question of nonreview," 84 and states his view that "a court initially decides" whether
an agency action is "reviewable in toto."88 The necessity for this
initial determination is consistent with Professor Davis' opinion that
"making all administrative discretion judicially reviewable would be
impracticable
"....
Saferstein's agreement is evidenced by his statement that "in appropriate circumstances the courts would not as a matter
of propriety and efficiency inquire into certain abuses. 87 In essence, it
appears that "the argument against review of arbitrary action boils
down to [administrative] convenience ....88
There are two major difficulties in sustaining an argument for a
threshold determination of nonreviewability upon the basis of administrative efficiency. The first is that there may be practical difficulties
in making such a determination; and the second is that there may be
"constitutional" objections in allowing the balancing of administrative
convenience with personal rights which have allegedly been infringed
by an abuse of discretion.
Taking the latter difficulty first, it is not easy to see how considerations of efficiency or convenience would justify such a threshold
determination. Professor Berger's claim that a plea for protection
against arbitrariness rises to constitutional dimensions89 was rejected
by Professor Davis, who argues that "[olne of Mr. Berger's pervasive
mistakes is to equate lack of authority to act arbitrarily with judicial
reviewability." 9 ° But is, or should this be conclusive? This writer submitted above that the question of reviewability should be resolved by
looking to the statutory authority under which the agency operates."
Many early Supreme Court decisions advanced in dicta the proposition
that "[t]here is no place in our constitutional system for the exercise
of arbitrary power ... ."" In discussing one such case, American
School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 8 Professor Schotland com83. But see text following note 19 supra.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Saferstein, supra note 11, at 375 n.36; see also id. at 368.
Id. at 395 (emphasis in original).
Davis, Postscript,supra note 10, at 831.
Saferstein, supra note 11, at 374 n.33 (emphasis added).
Berger, Judicial Review, supra note 13, at 81.
Id. at 57.

90. Davis, Not Always Reviewable, supra note 10, at 646.

91. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
92. Garfield v. United States ex rel. Goldsby, 211 U.S. 249, 262 (1908). See also
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1896), where the Court stated that our institutions of government "do not mean to leave room for the play and action of purely
personal and arbitrary power." Id. at 370.
93. 187 U.S. 94, 109-10 (1902).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/1
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mented that "even in 1902 .

.

. the Court .

.

. rejected the notion that

administrative action might be wholly beyond judicial review, and therefore beyond assurance of constitutionality." 4
The most influential statement of this position came from Professor
Henry Hart, who declared that it is "a necessary postulate of constitutional government - that a court must always be available to pass on
claims of constitutional right to judicial process, and to provide such
process if the claim is sustained."9' 5 He asserted that the Supreme Court
saw that
the courts had a responsibility to see that statutory authority was
not transgressed, that a reasonable procedure was used in exercising the authority, and -

seemingly also - that human beings were

not unreasonably subjected, even by direction of Congress, to an
uncontrolled official discretion.96
Notwithstanding the above argument, Saferstein relegates consideration of constitutional difficulties to a footnote." He states that
there "is no reason to believe that such a right would not depend - as
do so many constitutional rights - upon a balancing.process . . .
between the individual and the institutional interests." ' However, in
other areas the asserted infringement of constitutional rights is actually
reviewed and not subject to a threshold determination of nonreviewability.99 It is difficult to see how considerations of efficiency serve to
preclude courts from receiving evidence in order to determine whether
or not a party can make a prima facie showing of abuse of discretion.
As Professor Berger has argued, such considerations of administrative
efficiency should not
be "balanced" against invasion of the constitutional right to be
protected against unreasonable officialdom. "Due process" can
hardly be denied because protection is "inconvenient."' 0'
94. Schotland, Federal Judicial Review, 26 AD. L. REV. 119, 121 (1974).
95. Hart, supra note 24, at 1372. Accord, Manges v. Camp, 474 F.2d 97 (5th
Cir. 1973), where the court held that "when there has been a clear departure from
statutory authority" a court-created exception to jurisdiction-withdrawing statutes
comes into play which "thereby exposes the offending agency to review of administrative action otherwise made unreviewable by statute." Id. at 99.
96. Hart, supra note 24, at 1390 (footnote omitted).
97. Saferstein, supra note 11, at 373 n.31.
98. Id. (citations omitted).
99. See JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL, supra note 12, at 376-89. Cf. Cappadora v.
Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 1, 6 (2d Cir. 1966).
100. Berger, Synthesis, supra note 13, at 987. See Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S.
163, 167 (1964) and United States ex rel. Marcial v. Fay, 247 F.2d 662 (2d Cir.
1957), where the court stated, "We must not play fast and loose with basic constitutional rights in the interest of administrative efficiency." Id. at 669. Cf. Argersinger
v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), where the Court held that no person may be
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Substituting "unauthorized" for "unreasonable" in the above quotation
would comport with the argument advanced here.
In addition to the constitutional difficulties attendant upon the
closure of a judicial forum for review of abuse of discretion at the
threshold, there are also practical difficulties in making the determination urged by Saferstein and Davis.1 ' Indeed, it is difficult to be sure
how many courts are actually assisted by the Saferstein-Davis approach
since, as Judge Winter observed in Littell v. Morton,
most courts do not directly face the issue; often they say that they
cannot review and yet proceed to discuss the 10merits
and find that
2
there is no evidence of an abuse of discretion.
This seems to have been the experience and the result in three
recent opinions, two of which explicitly cite Saferstein's article. In
East Oakland-FruitvalePlanning Council v. Rumsfeld, '13 an applicant
for a grant of funds under the Economic Opportunity Act sued to compel
the director of the Office of Economic Opportunity to override a governor's veto of its community organizing plan. The court held that
"the Director's ultimate decision to override or not to override" is
"not subject to judicial review."' 0 4 However, the court went on to say
that it "does not follow ...that no aspect of the Director's action can
be reviewed,"' °5 since "the statute imposes a number of limitations
upon the scope of the Director's discretion,"' 6 and accordingly, the
court would enforce such a "clear and specific statutory limitation upon
that discretion."' 0' Therefore, in this instance, it is less than clear what
function the threshold determination of nonreviewability serves.

Similarly, in Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. United States,'0 ° an
action for refund of an alleged overpayment of postage, the court held
"that the Postmaster-General's refusal to grant the appellant a postage
refund is not subject to judicial review."' 0 0 However, the court proimprisoned, absent intelligent waiver, for any offense, unless he was represented by
counsel at his trial. Id. at 37. Chief Justice Burger, concurring in the result, noted
that, "This will mean not only more defense counsel must be provided, but also
additional prosecutors and better facilities for securing information about the
accused ...." Id. at 43 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
101. Cf. Berger, Synthesis, supra note 13, at 987 n.130.
102. 445 F.2d at 1211.
103. 471 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1972).
104. Id. at 533.
105. Id. See National Forest Pres. Group v. Butz, 485 F.2d 408, 411 (9th
Cir. 1973).
106. 471 F.2d at 534 (emphasis added).
107. Id.
108. 395 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1968).
109. Id. at 357.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/1

16

Mahinka: The Problem of Nonreviewability: Judicial Control of Action Commi
NOVEMBER,

1974]

PROBLEM OF NONREVIEWABILITY

ceeded to find that the parties, had raised "an additional issue ...

as to

whether the Postmaster's denial of a refund in the instant case constitutes arbitrary action or a clear abuse of discretion.""'

The court then

reviewed this allegation, and found that it was without merit.11 '
In a well-known decision, Hahn v. Gottlieb, 2 the First Circuit
considered a petition for an injunction restraining the Federal Housing
Administration from approving a rent increase for a federally subsidized,
low-income housing project, pending opportunity for the tenants to be
heard upon the proposed increase. After a lengthy examination of the
factors proposed by Saferstein,"' the court concluded that there was
"clear and convincing" evidence that Congress did not intend
courts to supervise FHA rent decisions. We therefore hold that
the approval of rents and charges is a "matter [sic] committed to
agency discretion by law" and thus not subject to judicial review." 4
However, immediately following this finding of nonreviewability of this
"matter," the court noted:
In so holding, we do not reach the question whether courts may
intervene in those rare cases where the FHA has ignored a plain
statutory duty, exceeded its jurisdiction, or committed constitutional error. The present case, which at best concerns a failure to
give proper weight to all the relevant considerations,
plainly falls
1 15
within the area committed to agency discretion.
Again, the threshold determination of nonreviewability does not seem
essential to the holding of the opinion.
The above opinions indicate that a finding of nonreviewability
should only be made in considering a particular case, and not upon a
preliminary determination that the "matter" or "area" is inappropriate

for review. The difference between the approach in Hahn and one
which emphasizes the individual case is exemplified by a Second Circuit

decision, Langevin v. Chenango Court, Inc.,"' which also held that the
110. Id. at 359.

111. Id.

112. 430 F.2d 1243 (1st Cir. 1970).

113. Id. at 1249-50.

114. Id. at 1251. See generally Note, Procedural Due Process in GovernmentSubsidized Housing, 86 HARV. L. REv. 880, 901-02 (1973).
115. 430 F.2d at 1251. The First Circuit relied upon Hahn in the recent decision
of Davis Assoc., Inc. v. Secretary of Housing & Urban Dev., 498 F.2d 385 (1st Cir.
1974), which held that a housing contractor was not entitled to judicial review of the
decision of a local housing authority rejecting the contractor's bids. The court, in
summary fashion, rejected the applicability of APA section 10(e), again relying only
upon Saferstein's analysis and considering the effect of neither Overton Park nor
any more recent decision in this area than Hahn itself. Id. at 390 & n.8. But see note
134 infra.
116. 447 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1971).
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approval of the FHA for a rental increase was not subject to judicial
review, but employed a significantly different analysis. Recognizing
the conflict between the exception for action committed to agency discretion and the direction to review abuses of discretion, Judge Friendly
initially referred to Professor Davis' formulation that:
[A]dministrative action is usually reviewable unless either (a)
congressional intent is discernible to make it unreviewable, or, (b)
the subject matter
is for some reason inappropriate for judicial
7
consideration."
In rejecting the reasoning of the court in Hahn, Judge Friendly noted
that "the First Circuit relied in part on Professor Davis' second 'unless' "1118 (which follows Saferstein's recommendation as well). Friendly
argued that "[a]ssessing the reasonableness of [such] an increase ...
does not seem beyond judicial competence."" ' 9 Nevertheless, he determined that "we reach the same conclusion of nonreviewability as the
First Circuit," but upon a significantly different ground - "on the
basis of Professor Davis' first 'unless.' ""20 As previously discussed,'
this would assimilate it to the exception in section 10(1), for statutes
precluding judicial review, rather than the section 10(2) exception for
action committed to agency discretion. Judge Friendly concluded by
noting that:
Like the First Circuit, "we do not reach the question whether
courts may intervene in those rare cases where the FHA has
ignored a plain statutory duty, exceeded its jurisdiction, or committed constitutional error," including cases where it is alleged
that the agency decision clearly "rested on an impermissible basis
such as 2an
invidious discrimination against a particular race or
2
group."
Judge Friendly apparently recognized the validity of Professor
Berger's caution that "arbitrariness [in the distinction used in this
article, unauthorized action] is too serious to be sheltered on an assumption that a particular category requires insulation.' 2 3 In the more
visible areas of racial or religious discrimination,' 24 this proposition
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
note 13,
124.

447 F.2d at 303, quoting DAVIS, TREATISE, supra note 10, § 28.16, at 965.
447 F.2d at 303.
Id.
Id.
See text accompanying notes 82-83 supra.
447 F.2d at 303 (citations omitted).
Berger, Arbitrariness, supra note 13, at 57; see also Berger, Sequel, supra
at 632.
Cf. Berger, Synthesis, supra note 13, at 995-96; see also A. BICKEL, THE
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/1
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would seem obvious; but even in less salient ones, it is difficult to
justify a threshold preclusion. For example, if, in an overcrowded
Public Health Service hospital, decisions must be made about which
types of patients must be discharged, it is difficult to see why a total
preclusion from review should be upheld if there are statutory purposes
12
or provisions which could serve as a guide for the reviewing court.
This attention to the statutory authority conferred upon an agency,
within which it exercises its discretion, 126 is discernible in Langevin
and in a few other cases. 27
It is submitted that this attention to the statutory mandate was
explicitly recognized in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe. 1 2 1 In Overton Park, a citizens' organization petitioned to enjoin
the Secretary of Transportation from releasing federal funds to a state
highway department for construction of a segment of an expressway
through a city park. In remanding for review upon a full administrative
record, the Court stated that "it may be necessary for the District Court
to require some explanation in order to determine if the Secretary
129 Justice Marshall, in his
acted within the scope of his authority ....
opinion for the Court, discussed the "committed to agency discretion"
exception as follows:
In this case, there is no indication that Congress sought to prohibit
judicial review and there is most certainly no "showing of 'clear
and convincing evidence' of a . . . legislative intent" to restrict
access to judicial review.
Similarly, the Secretary's decision here does not fall within
the exception for action "committed to agency discretion." This
is a very narrow exception. The legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act indicates that it is applicable in those rare
instances where "statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in
a given case there is no law to apply."' 3 °
125. Cf. Leyden v. FAA, 315 F. Supp. 1398, 1404 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
126. For a discussion of the various degrees of discretion see Dworkin, supra
note 23, at 32-34.
127. See Bachowski v. Brennan, 502 F.2d 79, 88-9) (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 95
S. Ct. 654 (1974) ; National Forest Pres. Group v. Butz, 485 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir.
1973) ; Manges v. Camp, 474 F.2d 97, 99 (5th Cir. 1973); SEC v. Republic Nat'l
Life Ins. Co., 383 F. Supp. 436, 438-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Duke City Lumber Co. v.
Butz, 382 F. Supp. 362, 370 n.16 (D.D.C. 1974); Farrell Lines, Inc. v. Camp, 499
F.2d 587, 596-600 (Ct. C1. 1974).
128. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). One commentator has noted that "prior to Overton
Park, no definitive assessment had been made [by the Court] of the 'committed to
agency discretion' provision." 60 GEO. L.J. 1101, 1107 (1972).
129. 401 U.S. at 420.
130. Id. at 410 (citations omitted) ; cf. Note, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe: Environmental Law and the Scope of Judicial Review, 24 STAN. L.
REv. 1117, 1120-22 (1972).
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In the above two paragraphs the Court apparently distinguishes
the exceptions of section 10(1) and section 10(2), considering them as
different grounds for exclusion, in contradiction to Saferstein.' 3' Furthermore, although the Court - speaking of statutorily unauthorized
action rather than arbitrariness' - did not adopt Professor Berger's
thesis completely,
[b]y thus restricting the exception, the Court took sides in
the debate regarding judicial review of administrative action,
33
aligning itself with those advocating a wide application of review.1
Although other commentators have stated that Overton Park has
settled the controversy, Professor Davis has argued that "the Court
recognized the existence of the exception [for action committed to
agency discretion] when it said: 'Plainly, there is "law to apply" and
thus the exception ... is inapplicable.' ,,13' However, this would appear
to be an extremely limited form of "recognition", in contrast to the wide
view of the exception which Davis and Saferstein entertain, since the
3
Court explicitly noted that it is "a very narrow exception."3'
The cases
0
following Overton Park have made this clear.'
For example, in
Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 37 the court, while acknowledging that the
relevant statutes invested the Commissioner of Indian Affairs with a
131. See Saferstein, supra note 11, at 377 n.43.
132. See text accompanying notes 19, 26 & 27 supra.
133. 60 GEo. L.J. 1101, 1108 (1972). While mentioning in a footnote that "[tihe
scope of the 'committed to agency discretion' exception has been the subject of extensive commentary" and citing two additional articles by Professor Berger, one by
Professor Davis, and Saferstein, it was Professor Berger to whom the Court cited
in support of the narrow scope of that exception. 401 U.S. at 410 n.23.
134. DAVIs, TEXT, supra note 10, § 28.05, at 515. For additional views that Overton
Park has settled the dispute, see Schwartz, Administrative Law Cases During 1971,
24 AD. L. REV. 299, 310-11 (1972) ; McCabe, Recent Developments in Judicial Review
of Administrative Actions: A Developmental Note, 24 AD. L. REV. 67 (1972). In the

latter article, the author, in addition to noting that the Court appears to have rejected
the Saferstein factor-analysis approach utilized in Hahn, states that the controlling
statute in Hahn would "surely" have been sufficient "law to apply," resulting in
"judicial review under the Overton Park test." Id. at 94. See also Note, Discretion
in a Crystal Closet: Applying a Systemic Approach to Determine the Reviewability

of Agency Discretion, 3 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 452 (1972).
135. 401 U.S. at 410 (footnote omitted); cf. Schotland, supra note 94, at 121.
136. See Ratnayke v. Mack, 499 F.2d 1207, 1209-10 (8th Cir. 1974); Secretary
of Labor v. Farino, 490 F.2d 885, 888-89 (7th Cir. 1973); Parker v. United States,
448 F.2d 793, 795 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989 (1972) ; Santor v.
Morton, 383 F. Supp. 1265, 1266-67 (D. Wyo. 1974); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
General Serv. Admin., 384 F. Supp. 996, 1000-01 (D.D.C. 1974) ; Nuclear Data, Inc.
v. AEC, 344 F. Supp. 719, 725-26 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (citation omitted).
Recently, the District of Columbia Circuit, relying upon Overton Park,
narrowly distinguished Panama Canal in holding that the imposition of an electricity
transmission service charge by the Secretary of the Interior was subject to judicial
review. See Associated Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Morton, 507 F.2d 1167, 1176-77 & n.18
(D.C Cir 1974)
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/1
137. 449 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1971).
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large element of discretion, closely examined the statutory authority
and the legislative purposes behind the mandate of authority concluding:
In sum, the legislative history does not support the contention
that the regulations promised under [the statutes] are wholly
within the discretion of the Commissioner and thus immune from
judicial review. The history demonstrates that the statutes were
passed with a specific set of objectives in mind and that the lawfulness of the Commissioner's exercise of discretion - his decisions
to regulate or not to regulate in any particular instance, as well as
the particular mode of regulation chosen - is to be determined
by reference to these objectives. 13
Given the practical difficulties in making the sort of threshold determination urged by Professor Davis and Saferstein, the arguable
constitutional impingements resulting from the denial to a party of the
judicial forum for review of administrative abuse, and the apparent
rejection of the Davis approach in Overton Park, it is difficult to accept
such an approach even if it were substantiated that "[t]he courts have
uniformly made an analysis like that" offered by Professor Davis upon
the "committed to agency discretion" exception.1" 9 Indeed, prior to
Overton Park at least three circuits had rejected Professor Davis' suggested approach. 4 ° Furthermore, several of the cases relied upon by
Professor Davis were criticized earlier in discussing the proposition
that a grant of broad discretion does not insulate agency action from
138. 449 F.2d at 572.
139. See DAVIS, TEXT, supra note 10, § 28.05, at 515 (emphasis in original),

referring to the argument examined at text accompanying notes 13-16 supra. See also
DAVIS, TREATISE, supra note 10, § 28.16, at 964.

140. See Littell v. Morton, 445 F.2d 1207-11 (4th Cir. 1971); Scanwell Labs.,
Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Wong Wing Hang v. Immigration & Natur. Serv., 360 F.2d 715, 718 (2d Cir. 1966). See also Ajay Nutr. Foods,
Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 378 F. Supp. 210 (D.N.J. 1974), where the court,
interpreting Zimmerman v. United States, 422 F.2d 326 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
399 U.S. 911 (1970), stated that "[t]his court holds ... that the law of [the Third]
Circuit conforms to that of the Second and Fourth Circuits on this threshold issue."
378 F. Supp. at 213.
In his treatise, Professor Davis listed several cases as supportive of his view
that there is "unreviewable administrative action." DAVIS, TREATISE, supra note 10,
§ 28.16, at 965-70. The cases, however, are distinguishable, as Professor Hart noted
in this passage from his celebrated "Dialogue":
Q. But it's notorious that there are all kinds of administrative decisions that
are not reviewable at all. Professor Davis devotes a whole fat chapter to
"Unreviewable Action" of administrative agencies.
A. [Professor Hart] Administrative law is a relatively new subject. Naturally
there have been a number of ill-considered opinions. But if you look closely at
Professor Davis' cases you'll find that almost all of them are distinguishable.
Many of them don't involve judicially enforceable duties of the complaining party
at all. Others involve political questions . ...
Hart,
supra note
23, at Charles
1378 (footnotes
omitted).
Published
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review. 14 ' Other cases he relies upon may be distinguished either upon
the bases that the decisions are allocated to another branch of government by the Constitution - for example, decisions upon foreign relations
- or the political question doctrine, 142 or that they are cases in which
review was precluded by clear Congressional intent, and thus fall within
the exception of section 10( 1 ).
While it is true that actions in the foreign relations area are generally unreviewable, 14 1 it is not because they fall within some expansive

reading of section 10(2); rather, the foreign policy decision by its
nature is nonjudicial, and therefore is one for review of which the
"judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities, nor responsibility .... ""'
For example, in holding that the question of which government of a
foreign nation is the lawful or recognized government is unreviewable
by a court, the Supreme Court stated, in National City Bank v. Republic
of China, 45 that "[t]he status of [foreign sovereigns] in our courts
is a matter for determination by the Executive and is outside the competence of this Court."' 40 It is difficult to see upon what grounds such
a political determination could be reviewed by the courts without in141. See the discussion in section II B supra. Some of the cases relied upon by
Professor Davis, in addition to Ferry, Panama Canal, and Hamel, are reviewed at
note 38 supra.
142. Even in this area there are some limits to discretion, as the Court held in
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974), rejecting the claim of an unreviewable Presidential privilege to withhold information from a criminal proceeding.
See Freund, The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, Foreword: On Presidential Privilege,
88 HARV. L. REV. 13, 20, 32-34 (1974); Symposium: United States v. Nixon, 22
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 4 (1974). Cf. Senate Select Comm. on Presid'l Campaign Activs.
v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 731 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Compare R. BERGER, ExECUTIVE
PRIVILEGE A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH (1974), with Sofaer, Book Review, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 281 (1974). See also Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1383,
1407 (1974) ; Dorsen & Shattuck, Executive Privilege: The Congress and the Courts,
35 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 11-23 (1974). But see Nathanson, From Watergate to Marbury
v. Madison: Some Reflections on Presidential Privilege in Current Historical Perspectives, 16 ARIZ. L. REV. 59, 75-76 (1974).
143. See Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 109-11
(1948) ; Peoples v. United States Dep't of Agr., 427 F.2d 561, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ;
JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL, supra note 12, at 363. See also United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (distinguishing the Chicago & S. Air Lines decision).
144. Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).
The Fifth Circuit has recently held that a decision of the State Department to recognize and allow a claim of sovereign immunity was not subject to judicial review under
the APA. Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614, 616-21 (5th Cir. 1974). The court noted
that it was "analyzing here the proper allocation of functions of the branches of the
government in the constitutional scheme of the United States." Id. at 618. See Ex
parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588-89 (1943).
145. 348 U.S. 356 (1955).
146. Id. at 358. Professor Davis cites this as a case of unreviewable discretionary
action. See Davis, Postscript, supra note 10, at 832.
A court will, however, in certain unusual circumstances, decide whether or
not a particular group constitutes a de facto government. See, e.g., Pan Am. World
Awys., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989, 1009-15 (2d Cir. 1974), an
action against the insurers of an aircraft hijacked over London and later destroyed
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/1
in Egypt by members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

22

Mahinka: The Problem of Nonreviewability: Judicial Control of Action Commi
NOVEMBER,

1974]

PROBLEM OF NONREVIEWABILITY

vading the constitutional prerogatives of the Executive in foreign
affairs.

147

Another case relied upon by Professor Davis, involving decisions
regarding national defense, further illustrates determinations that are
allocated to the Executive. In Curran v. Laird,148 the District of
Columbia Circuit held that a provision of the Cargo Preference Act
prohibiting the use of foreign vessels to transport American military
cargo was subject to an implied exception that foreign ships may be
used when American ships were not available; and the question of
whether United States ships should have been made available by
requisitioning them from the "national defense reserve fleet" (the
"mothball" fleet) was within a span of actions not subject to
judicial
review. 4 9 In so holding, Judge Leventhal carefully distinguished this
case upon its facts:
That the matter before us for consideration lies in the special
zones of exceptions, rather than the ordinary area of judicial reviewability, is established by several cardinal aspects of the issues.
The case involves decisions relating to the conduct of national
defense; the President has a key role; the national interest contemplates and requires flexibility in management of defense resources ....150
147. See generally L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 37-65,
208-16 (1972), on the scope of Executive power and the judicial review of foreign
affairs matters.
148. 420 F.2d 122 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
149. Id. at 128.
150. Id. at 152. The Curran Court later emphasized that:
The point of our decision is that there is a narrow band of matters that are
wholly committed to official discretion, and that the inappropriateness or even
mischief involved in appraising a claim of error or of abuse of discretion, and
testing it in an evidentiary hearing, leads to the conclusion that there has been
withdrawn from the judicial ambit any consideration of whether the official
action is "arbitrary" or constitutes an abuse of discretion.
Id. at 131.
The view expressed by the District of Columbia Circuit in Curran was
reiterated in Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir.
1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972), where the court, in distinguishing
Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666 (1960), noted that "the subject matter of the regulatory scheme in Schilling was permeated with overtones of foreign affairs and
national defense policy .......
432 F.2d at 666 n.6 (citations omitted). Accord,
United States ex rel. Schonbrun v. Commanding Officer, Armed Forces, 403 F.2d 371,
375 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 929 (1969).
National defense policy was also a major reason for the decision in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1944), where the Court deferred to
an Executive-military judgment directing the exclusion of all persons of Japanese
ancestry from designated West Coast "military areas." Cf. Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). But see United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263-64
(1967); cf. Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 339 n.20 (1974)
(Douglas, J.,
dissenting). The background and import of this deplorable episode have been thoughtfully discussed recently by Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower, first Director of the War

Relocation Authority. M. EISENHOWER, THE PRESIDENT IS CALLING
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1974 95-127 (1974).
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Moreover, in areas not so clearly allocated to the Executive, it is,
as the Supreme Court noted in Baker v. Carr, 5' "error to suppose that
every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond
judicial cognizance. ' 1 2 As Professors Steiner and Vagts have noted,
"[i]n numerous fields with important bearing upon foreign relations,
the courts have critically reviewed executive action and indeed exercised
judicial review over legislation. Recall the passport cases ...and the

deportation cases."1 3 Even within the area of exclusion of aliens, traditionally regarded as being solely within Executive power, the recent
decision of Kleindienst v. Mandel..4 left open the possibility of judicial
review in an appropriate future case, the court stating that "[w]hat
First Amendment or other grounds may be available for attacking
exercise of discretion for which no justification is advanced is a question
we neither address nor decide in this case."' 5 5
As noted above, other cases upon which Professor Davis relied
for his proposition of unreviewable administrative action are distinguishable upon the ground that review is precluded by clear congressional intent. For example, Davis asserts that "[o]ne important area
of administrative action in which judicial review is unavailable even if
the agency acts arbitrarily or in abuse of discretion involves the suspension or refusal to suspend newly filed rates."' 56 However, in the case
Davis cites as supporting his position, Arrow Transportation Co. Z'.
Southern Railway Co.,' 57 Justice Brennan explicitly concluded that ConSee also Rostow, The Japanese American Cases - A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489,
503, 508, 515 (1945).
151. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
152. Id. at 211. Cf. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL, supra note 12, at 366, where the
author concludes that, "There should therefore be no rule which automatically bars
a judicial test of validity simply because the machinery of the Presidency is involved."

Cf. also Hochman, Judicial Review of Administrative Processes in Which the
President Participates,74 HARV. L. REV. 684, 712 (1961).
153. H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 532 (1968).
The cases alluded to include Woodby v. Immigration & Natur. Serv., 385 U.S. 276
(1966) ; Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) ; Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S.
500 (1964) ; Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958). Cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 461 (1964) (White, J., dissenting); see also Berdo v.
Immigration & Natur. Serv., 432 F.2d 824, 845 (6th Cir. 1970).
154. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
155. Id. at 770. See 14 HARV. INT'L L.J. 158 (1973), where the author states:
Faced with the rights of citizens rather than those of aliens alone, the Court
expressly refused to accept the government's contention that the Attorney
General's [statutory] waiver power is invariably immune from judicial review."
Id. at 162.
Of course, if Mandel is interpreted narrowly, the proffered test of "facial
legitimacy and bona fide reason" may be of little or no practical value because of the
ease with which the Attorney General can develop ex post factum the necessary
reasons for his action. Id. at 167. See also 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 499, 505, 507 (1973).
For a similar view of executive exclusionary power, see Cafeteria Workers Local 473

v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 898 (1961).
156. DAvIs, TREATISE, supra note 10, § 28.16, at 966.
157. 372 U.S. 658 (1963).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/1
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gress meant to "preclude judicial review" by its statutory scheme in
this area:
Congress engaged in a protracted controversy concerning the
period for which the Commission might suspend a change of rates.
Such a controversy would have been a futile exercise unless the
Congress also meant to foreclose judicial power to extend that
period. This controversy spanned nearly two decades. 5 '

The Court's characterization of Arrow Transportation as a decision consistent with the exception of section 10(1) finds additional
support in United States v. SCRAP'59 and the decision of the District of

Columbia Circuit in Municipal Light Boards v. Federal Power Comnmission (FPC).160 In the latter case the court, relying on Arrow
Transportation,6 ' held that an order by the FPC to suspend for 1 day
an electric company's increase in rates for wholesale electricity was not
subject to judicial review under the Federal Power Act. Writing for
the court, Judge Leventhal distinguished Environmental Defense Fund
v. Hardin, where a refusal to suspend the use of a pesticide was held
reviewable, 6 2 stating that in Hardin:
[W]e required a showing of "clear evidence of legislative intent"
to preclude judicial review . . . . The history of the suspension
power of the ICC [and the long line of cases holding refusal to
suspend filed rates unreviewable exercises of agency discretion]
03
place this case in a clearly different context.

One area in which nonreviewability for abuse of discretion has
been prevalent is a prosecutor's decision to bring or not to bring an
action. Traditionally, decisions concerning the initiation of judicial or

administrative proceedings have been considered broadly discretionary,' and there are many cases which hold that prosecutorial discretion
158. Id. at 664.
159. 412 U.S. 669, 691, 694-95 & n.20, 697 (1973). See also Indiana & Mich.
Elec. Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 502 F.2d 336, 347 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(petition for rehearing); American Tel. & Tel. v. FCC, 487 F.2d 865, 873 (2d Cir.
1973). For a discussion of the proposition that the Arrow doctrine and the National
Environmental Policy Act need not be viewed as necessarily in conflict, see 1974
Wis. L. REV. 600.
160. 450 F.2d 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989 (1972).
161. Id. at 1349-51.
162. 428 F.2d at 1098.
163. 450 F.2d at 1351 n.23 (citations omitted) ; cf. Rural Elec. Admin. v. Central
La. Elec. Co., 354 F.2d 859 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 815 (1966), a case also
relied upon by Davis, wherein the court stated: "From the entire history of the Rural
Electrification Act . . . we are totally convinced that Congress has never enacted or
intended that loans by this agency should be reviewable in the Courts." Id. at 865.
164. See Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962
and "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 HARV. L.
308, 348-49
(1967).
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is unreviewable.' 65 The Supreme Court has recently remarked, in
United States v. Nixon,'66 that "the Executive Branch has exclusive
authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a
case

....

"167

The reasons for this unwillingness to provide judicial oversight
are varied. Professor Davis has noted that nonreviewability of prosecutors' discretion was established at an early period in the Court's history, when reluctance to oversee Executive action was much greater.""
Chief Justice -

then Circuit Judge -

Burger, in Newman v. United

States, 6 9

observed that "[f]ew subjects are less adapted to judicial
review than the exercise by the Executive of his discretion in deciding
when and whether to institute criminal proceedings .

*...""'o

In United

165. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), where the Court stated that
the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board [NLRB] "has unreviewable discretion to refuse to institute an unfair labor practice complaint ....
"
id. at 182; Kixmiller v. SEC, 492 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1974), where the court, relying
upon Vaca commented that "[a]n agency's decision to refrain from an investigation
or an enforcement action is generally unreviewable .......
Id. at 645 (footnote
omitted). The revelant statute in Vaca is unusually clear concerning the discretion
given to the General Counsel of the NLRB. Section 3(d) of the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1970), provides that the General Counsel "shall
have final authority ... in respect of the investigation of charges and issuance of complaints . . . and in respect of the prosecution of such complaints before the Board . .. ."
But see Augspurger v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 510 F.2d 853 (8th Cir.
1975), where the court stated, "The discretion of the General Counsel . . . is'broad,
but not necessarily absolute." Id. at 858 n.8.
166. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
167. Id. at 693. See Van Alstyne, A Political-ConstitutionalReview of United
States v. Nixon, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 116, 134 (1974). For an argument that the
Court's statement need not be taken as a dependable guide to future decisions, see
Mishkin, Great Cases and Soft Law: A Comment on United States v. Nixon, 22
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 76, 81-82 (1974).
168. DAVIS, TEXT, supra note 10, § 28.06, at 523.
169. 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
170. Id. at 480. See Friendly, Judicial Control of Discretionary Administrative
Action, 23 J. LEGAL ED. 63, 67-68 (1970).
Recent comparative law studies have indicated, however, that pessimistic
appraisals of the possibility of controlling prosecutorial discretion need not be taken
as conclusive. For instance, in the Federal Republic of Germany legislation has been
implemented to limit prosecutorial discretion in felony cases and serious misdemeanors.
ST. PO § 152(2)-(4) (C.H. Beck 1969). The German system has recently been
described in Herrmann, The Role of Compulsory Prosecution and the Scope of
ProsecutorialDiscretion in Germany, 41 U. CmI. L. REV. 468 (1974). The utility of
comparing that system to current American practice has been stressed in Langbein,
Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, 41 U. CHi. L. REv. 439 (1974).
Professor Langbein describes the German approach as regulating "the prosecutor's
monopoly [upon bringing prosecutions] by giving the citizens the right to depart-

mental and judicial review of decisions not to prosecute." Id. at 461. The statutory
procedure is analogous to a mandamus action for a judicial decree to require the
prosecutor to prosecute. He concludes that "these remedies constitute significant
controls over and deterrents against abuse of prosecutorial authority." Id. at 463.
While the structures of German and American criminal procedure differ considerably,
the German approach should, at the least, be considered suggestive of both the possibility of and methods for some degree of control over prosecutorial discretion. See
also Schram, The Obligation to Prosecute in West Germany, 17 AM. J. CoMp. L. 627
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/1
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States v. Cox,17 1 the Fifth Circuit suggested that the doctrine of separation of powers was an alternative ground for not allowing court
interference with the unbridled exercise of the Executive's discretionary
power to prosecute. 1 72 Thus, it might be concluded that this area is one
allocated to a branch other than the judiciary.
It is not at all clear, however, that these factors must serve to
preclude all judicial review, whatever the abuse alleged or remedy
appropriate. In terms of the argument presented previously, a threshold
determination that this is a "matter" or "area" of nonreview should be
rejected. Ironically, Professor Davis has been one of the chief advocates of an expanded judicial role in this area.' 7 3 He has asked, "if
abuse of the prosecuting power is a major cause of denial of equal justice
throughout our whole system of law and government, why should
the courts refuse to inquire whether the power has been abused?"' 7 4
In the area of prosecutorial discretion, the availability of review
should depend upon the statutory authority of the agency exercising its
choice. Ambiguity is common in statutes which provide that an officer
"may act" or "shall act." Prosecution may be directed only in the
presence or absence of specified circumstances, or authority to prosecute
may be granted without reference to any standards by which the officer's
decision might be reviewed. At other times, the meaning of a particular
statute may not be clear. Only in instances where authority is granted
without reference to any standard should a decision be held completely
(1969); Jescheck, The Discretionary Powers of the Prosecuting Attorney in West
Germany, 18 AM. J. Comp. L. 508 (1970). Cf. LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion
in the United States, 18 AM. J. Comp. L. 532, 538-39 (1970).
171. 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965).
172. Id. at 171. In Inmates of Attica Correc. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d
375 (2d Cir. 1973), the Second Circuit relied upon the separation of powers argument
of Cox in holding that the decision to investigate, arrest, and prosecute various state
officers and officials for alleged violations of the federal civil rights of state prison
inmates was left to the sole discretion of the United States Attorney. Id. at 379-80.
The court stated that:
In the absence of statutorily defined standards governing reviewability, or regulatory or statutory policies of prosecution, the problems inherent in the task of supervising prosecutorial decisions do not lend themselves to resolution by the judiciary.
Id. at 380. See United States v. Olson, 504 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1974) ; United
States v. Brown, 481 F.2d 1035, 1042-43 (8th Cir. 1973) ; United States v. Bland,
472 F.2d 1329, 1335-36 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1973) ; Georgia
v. Mitchell, 450 F.2d 1317, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Spillman v. United States, 413
F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 930 (1969) ; Smith v. United States,
375 F.2d 243, 246-48 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 841 (1967) ; Committee for
Consid. of Jones Falls Sew. Sys. v. Train, 387 F. Supp. 526, 529 (D. Md. 1975);
United States v. Perkins, 383 F. Supp. 922, 928 (N.D. Ohio 1974). Cf. Oyler v. Boles,
368 U.S. 448, 455-56 (1962). See also United States v. Gainey, 440 F.2d 290, 291-92
(D.C. Cir. 1971). But see DAVIS, TEXT, supra note 10, § 28.07, at 522.
173. DAVIS, TREATISE, supra note 10, § 28.16, at 982-90.
174. Id. § 28.16, at 983. See generally Note, Reviewability of Prosecutorial DisPublished
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unreviewable.' 7 ' Since such statutes are rare, it is submitted that this
area of discretionary activity be subject to closer and more frequent
review where prima facie cases of abuse of discretion exist." 6
A case which illustrates the difficulties and hardships created by a
total prohibition of review is Peek v. Mitchell, 7 where the plaintiffs
sought to compel the Attorney General of the United States and the
United States Attorney to prosecute known civil rights violators. The
court held that such control over the discretion of those prosecutors
was beyond judicial powers.'
However, should this be the case?
Clearly, in Peek, fundamental constitutional rights had been allegedly
violated, and the victims left without legal recourse because of a refusal
to prosecute.7 Although it is arguable that the authority of an Attorney General or a regulatory agency to prosecute exists independent
of any judicially ascertainable standard, and that therefore there is no
"law to apply," review is not necessarily precluded. A court nonetheless may be able to inquire upon what grounds the decision was made
despite the fact that the court cannot interfere with the officer's judgment. This structuring of administrative discretion by requiring a
reasoned decision for the exercise of prosecutorial or regulatory choice
has recently been followed in many cases by the District of Columbia
Circuit,8 0 and has increasingly found acceptance in the Supreme
Court.'
Several decisions in the Circuit Courts in recent years have also
cast doubts on the continued legitimacy of the concept of totally unreviewable prosecutorial discretion. The First Circuit, in Trailways,
175. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
176. It should be noted that an agency's failure to act is included within the
APA's definition of agency action, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (13) (1970), and that section
706 (1) of the APA states that the reviewing court shall "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed ....
".Administrative Procedure Act
§ 10(e)(A), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1) (1970).
177. 419 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1970).
178. Id. at 577. The ruling in Peek was criticized in DAvIs, TREATISE, supra
note 9, § 28.16, at 985. See also Inmates of Attica Correc. Facility v. Rockefeller,
477 F.2d 375, 379-82 (2d Cir. 1973) ; Georgia v. Mitchell, 450 F.2d 1317, 1321 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
179. For a discussion of the problems involved with complete deference to
prosecutorial discretion in the civil rights field, see Note, Discretion to Prosecute
Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 74 YALE L.J. 1297 (1965).

180. See, e.g., American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. FPC, 494 F.2d 925, 944-45 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 148 (1974) ; Citizens Ass'n v. Zoning Comm'n, 477 F.2d

402, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See generally Leventhal, Environmental Decisioniaking
and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 511-12 (1974). See also note
244 infra.

181. See Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 805-06
(1973); Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142-43 (1973) (per curiam) ; FTC v. Sperry
& I-utchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 248-49 (1972). See also Burlington Truck Lines v.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/1
United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167 (1962).
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Inc. v. CAB' 2 held that the Civil Aeronautics Board's refusal to
prosecute airlines for maintaining unjustly discriminatory fees was
reviewable as there was alleged an abuse of discretion. The court found
the Board's reasons for not prosecuting inadequate and held that the
83
Board must proceed with the investigation sought by the petitioners.'
In Safir v. Gibson'S4 the Second Circuit also held a failure to prosecute
reviewable. In that decision, the plaintiffs requested that the court order
the Maritime Administrator to institute action to recover subsidies paid
to member companies of a shipping conference, found by the Federal
Maritime Commission to have willfully cut rates for the purpose of
eliminating the plaintiff's competition, in violation of the Shipping
Act.' 5 Judge Friendly rejected an argument that the Administrator
had unreviewable and unlimited discretion and held that a failure to act
could be reviewed to determine whether discretion had been properly
exercised, and if so, whether such had been upon grounds consistent
with the statute.'8 6
More recently in Bachowski v. Brennan,18 7 the Third Circuit held
that Congress in authorizing suit by the Secretary of Labor as the
exclusive post-election remedy for violations of Title IV of the LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959'1 (L-MRDA),
did not intend to render unreviewable the Secretary's decision not to
bring a suit challenging a union election.' s9 The court, noting that
"[n]ot every refusal by a Government official to take action to enforce
a statute ... is unreviewable," concluded that "the principle of absolute
prosecutorial discretion is not applicable to the facts of this case."'
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

412 F.2d 926 (1st Cir. 1969).
Id. at 936. See REA Express, Inc. v. CAB, 507 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 1974).
417 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
Id. at 974-75.
Id. at 978. See DAVIS, TEXT, supra note 10, § 28.06, at 520-21, for further

discussion of both Trailways and Safir.

187. 502 F.2d 79 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S.Ct. 654 (1974) (No. 450).
188. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, tit. iv, § 402,
29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1964).
189. 502 F.2d at 85.
190. Id. at 87. The court suggested that the doctrine of prosecutorial discretion
"should be limited to those civil cases . . .involv[ing] the vindication of societal or
governmental interests rather than the protection of individual interests .... ." Id.
Inasmuch as these two types of interests would almost always both be present in a
particular case, any such distinction would seem to be necessarily highly arbitrary
and of limited utility in practice.
See DeVito v. Shultz, 300 F. Supp. 381 (D.D.C. 1969), where the court
required the Secretary of Labor to provide "an adequate written statement of his
reasons for non-intervention" in a contested union election in which there were
irregularities. Id. at 384. The court held that those seeking the prosecution "have a
judicially enforceable right to demand that the Secretary exercise his discretionary
authority in a manner consistent with the requirements of the Act and not arbitrarily
or capriciously." Id. at 383. For further discussion of Judge Gesell's opinion in
De Vito, see DAVIS, TEXT, supra note 10, § 28.05, at 517-18.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1974
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'The court held not only that "judicial review of the Secretary's decision
:not to bring suit should extend . . . to an inquiry into his reasons for
that decision to ensure that he has not abused the discretion granted
to him by L-MRDA," but also, significantly, that review could extend
to the factual basis of the Secretary's determination of the merit of a
The court criticized those cases holding review of the
complaint.'
Secretary's factual conclusions improper and stated:
The Secretary may as easily defeat the purpose of the L-MRDA
by ignoring overwhelming evidence of violations affecting the outcome of an election as by refusing to file suit for reasons not
intended by Congress. In either case, judicial review should be
available to ensure that the Secretary's actions are not arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion.' 9 2
Another case which held an agency's refusal to require compliance
reviewable is Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC,' where
the petitioner requested the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) to
take action against Dow Chemical Company for the company's refusal to
include in a proxy statement a resolution that the company should refrain from selling napalm for use against human beings. In a surprising
reversal of the assumption that the SEC's determinations in this area
were unreviewable, T' the District of Columbia Circuit held that the
SEC's no-action determination was indeed reviewable, and remanded
for a clarification of the reasons for the decision.' 95 Also, in Adams '.
Richardson,90 that circuit affirmed an order directing the Secretary
of Health, Education, and 'Welfare to commence enforcement proceedings against 74 secondary and primary school districts which had been
found either to have reneged upon previously approved desegregation
plans or to be otherwise not in compliance with Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.'
Relying upon Overton Park, the court rejected
the argument that enforcement of Title VI was committed solely to
191. 502 F.2d at 88-90. Accord, Schonfeld v. Wirtz, 258 F. Supp. 705, 708
(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
192. 502 F.2d at 89-90. The Third Circuit relied upon Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
193. 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
194. See Comment, Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC: Judicial Review
of SEC No-Action Determinations under the Proxy Rules, 57 VA. L. REv. 331,
332 (1971).
195. 432 F.2d at 682. The agency had already instituted investigatory proceedings, but had concluded that the petitioner was not entitled to relief. Id. at 663.
The Medical Committee decision was recently limited and distinguished in
Kixmiller v. SEC, 492 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1974), where the court held that judicial
review of SEC action was confined to when orders were issued and was not available
when the SEC merely refused to investigate. Id. at 644.
196. 480 F.2d 11-59 (D.C. Cir 1973).
197. Id. at 1160-61. The relevant statute was 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 to -6 (1970).
The court also ordered 10 state-operated systems of higher education to submit
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/1
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agency discretion, since there was "law to apply". 95 The court noted
that:
Appellants rely almost entirely on cases in which courts have declined to disturb the exercise of prosecutorial discretion by the
Attorney General or by United States Attorneys. Georgia v.
Mitchell. Those cases do not support a claim to absolute discretion
and are, in any event, distinguishable from the case at bar. 9'
Even in the area of criminal prosecutions, arguably an area where
a broad discretion would be the most appropriate, review has been
granted in several instances in cases of alleged retaliatory. ° or discriminatory 2° 1 prosecution. For example, in Nader v. Saxbe, 210 an
action was brought against the Attorney General of the United States
and other federal officials seeking to compel them to initiate prosecutions
against persons who had failed to file reports of political campaign contributions and expenditures pursuant to the Federal Corrupt Practices
Act of 1925.20 3 While the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of the action, 0 4 the basis for decision was that the plaintiffs
appropriate plans to end racial discrimination, directing the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare to initiate compliance procedures if an acceptable plan were
not arrived at within a specified period. Id. at 1164-65. One state which refused to
submit a plan has been sued by the Department of Justice. See Egerton, Adams v.
Richardson: Can Separate Be Equal?, 6 CHANGE 29 (Dec.-Jan. 1974-75).
198. 480 F.2d at 1161-62.
199. Id. at 1162 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
200. See MacDonald v. Musick, 425 F.2d 373, 375 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 852 (1970) ; Dixon v. District of Columbia, 394 F.2d 966, 968 (D.C. Cir.
1968) ; United States v. Handler, 383 F. Supp. 1267, 1270-72 (D. Md. 1974).
201.
See United States v. Swanson, 509 F.2d 1205, 1208-09 (8th Cir. 1975)
(allegedly discriminatory prosecution for failure to file federal income tax returns) ; United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211--13 (2d Cir. 1974) (allegedly
discriminatory prosecution for violation of ban upon holding union office after conviction for a felony) ; United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 618-24 (7th Cir. 1973)
(selective service laws) ; United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1972)
(refusing to answer census questions) ; United States v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074,
1078-79 (4th Cir. 1972) (leaflettings upon government property); Lennon v. United
States, 387 F. Supp. 561, 563-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (deportation proceedings); United
States v. Robinson, 311 F. Supp. 1063, 1064-65 (W.D. Mo. 1969) (illegal wiretapping).
But see United States v. Raven, 500 F.2d 728, 733 & n.14 (5th Cir. 1974) ; United
States v. Ream, 491 F.2d 1243, 1246 (5th Cir. 1974). For further discussion of judicially imposed limitations upon prosecutorial discretion, see Amsterdam, The One-Sided
Sword: Selective Prosecution in Federal Courts, 6 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 1 (1974) ;
Comment, Curbing of Prosecutor's Discretion: United States v. Falk, 9 HARV. CIv.
RIGHTs-Civ. LIB. L. REV. 372 (1974).
Professor Davis is of the opinion that not only should prosecutorial discretion be subject to judicial review (see DAVIS, TREATISE, supra note 9, § 28.16, at
982-92); other police practices as well should no longer be exempt from judicial
review. See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 80-96
(1969); Davis, An Approach to Legal Control of the Police, 52 TEXAS L. REv.
703 (1974).
202. 497 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
203. Act of Feb. 28, 1925, ch. 368, tit. III, 43 Stat. 1070.
204. The district court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted upon the alternative grounds that 1) prosecutorial disPublished
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sought only prospective relief, and therefore lacked standing to sue
since the Act's reporting requirements had been repealed 05 after the
suit had been initiated.2 °0 The court, in an opinion by Judge Wright,
noted that while the "federal courts have customarily refused to order
prosecution of particular individuals at the instance of private persons," 2 7 the complaint in question sought instead "a conventionally
judicial determination of whether certain fixed policies allegedly followed by the Justice Department and the United States Attorney's
office" lay outside "the constitutional and statutory limits of prosecutorial discretion.

' 20

The court argued that based upon the constitu-

tional mandate that the Executive "take care that the laws be faithfully
executed" 20 9 the "exercise of prosecutorial discretion, like the exercise
of Executive discretion generally, is subject to statutory and constitutional limits enforceable through judicial review.

2 -1

Although there are fewer clear examples, there appears to be some
willingness to review discretionary determinations of regulatory agencies to prosecute, as well as determinations not to prosecute. A leading
case in this area is Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 21 1 where the Supreme
Court considered whether cease and desist orders against the petitioner
should be withheld until the petitioner's competitors were also proceeded against, in view of the competitive harm which would otherwise
ordered the Attorney General to exercise his discretion, by deciding not to prosecute
when informed of violations he had done so already. Nader v. Kleindienst, 375 F.
Supp. 1138 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd upon other grounds sub. noin. Nader v. Saxbe, 497
F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
205. The 1925 Act was repealed by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1972,
2 U.S.C. §§ 431-54 (Supp. III 1973).

206. 497 F.2d at 680-81.
207. Id. at 679 n.18. See notes 169-72 and 177 and accompanying text supra.
208. Id. at 679.
209. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
210. 497 F.2d at 679-80 n.19. The constitutional ground suggested in Nader to
permit review should be compared with the separation-of-powers ground proposed as
precluding review in United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 935 (1965). See note 172 and accompanying text supra. The court in Nader
also noted that "[T]he decisions of this court have never allowed the phrase 'prosecutorial discretion' to be treated as a magical incantation which automatically provides
a shield for arbitrariness." 497 F.2d at 680 n.19, quoting Medical Comm. for Human
Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
See Joint Tribal Council v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 649 (D. Me. 1975), an
action concerning the refusal to institute suit on behalf of an Indian tribe against
the State of Maine. The defendants argued that the action was committed to agency
discretion under § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2) (1970), in that the Attorney General had
absolute discretion to institute litigation, and that judicial review, is banned by the
doctrine of prosecutorial discretion, relying on such cases as United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683 (1974), and Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
388 F. Supp. at 665. In granting relief, the court, relying on Nader v. Saxbe, 497
F.2d 676, 679-80 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1974), noted that only a declaratory judgment was
sought by plaintiffs, and that "the doctrine of prosecutorial discretion cannot shield
legal error." 388 F. Supp. at 665-66.
211. 355 U.S. 411 (1958) (per curiam).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/1
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result. In ruling for the Federal Trade Commission, the Court stated
that the courts should defer to the expertise of the Commission as to
the most propitious time to proceed212 and "its discretionary determination should not be overturned in the absence of a patent abuse of dis21
cretion."2 1 3 Several years later in Universal-Rundle Corp. v. FTC, '
the Seventh Circuit, relying upon the Supreme Court's dicta in Moog,
found an abuse of discretion to exist within the FTC's decision to prosecute the defendant corporation because while defendant's share of the
market was less than 6 percent, the practice complained of was common
to the industry.2 1 The Supreme Court, although subsequently reversing
upon the ground that the Commission's proceeding against UniversalRundle was not a patent abuse of discretion, approved generally the view
expressed by the Seventh Circuit, stating that the Commission "does not
have unbridled power to initiate proceedings which will arbitrarily
destroy one of many law violators in an industry.

' 210

More recently, in Marco Sales Co. v. FTC,"7 the Second Circuit
held that in the light of the Commission's ability to regulate the food
and gasoline retailing industries' promotional games by eliminating only
those practices deemed to be deceptive, the Commission's absolute prohibition of their use by the plaintiff in its lottery-retailing business,
where there was no deception or fraud practiced at all, was an abuse of
discretion."'

The court distinguished the case from Universal-Rundle,

where the defendant claimed that the FTC had abused its discretion by
not prosecuting other violators, stating:
The arbitrary character of the Commission's action here consists of its total failure to even advert to, much less explain, its
reason for the rigid ad hoc adjudicatory stance it adopted toward
the petitioner and the flexible tolerance its industry regulation
displayed to those utilizing the same or similar devices. 219
212. Id. at 413.
213. Id. at 414 (emphasis added). While it has been held that the FTC has wide
discretion in its choice of remedies deemed adequate to (leal with illegal and unfair
practices: Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 376 (1965); FTC v. ColgatePalmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 392 (1965); the Second Circuit qualified the FTC's
discretion in observing that it "is not absolute and does not immunize from review
an order . . . which sweeps across lawful and unlawful behavior without distinction."
Federated Nat. Whlslrs. Serv. v. FTC, 398 F.2d 253, 260 (2d Cir. 1968).
214. 352 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1965), rev'd, 387 U.S. 244 (1967).
215. Id. at 834. See DAVIS, TREATISE, supra note 10, § 28.16, at 989; Comment,
Abuse of Discretion: Administrative Expertise vs. Judicial Surveillance, 115 U. PA.
L. REv. 40 (1966).
216. FTC v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 387 U.S. 244 249-52 (1967). Id. at 251.
The Court's caveat apparently was not considered by the District of Columbia Circuit

in Action on Safety & Health v. FTC, 498 F.2d 757 (D.C. Cir. 1974), which noted
that the general enforcement power of the Commission was "generally not subject to
judicial review." Id. at 762. Cf. Kixmiller v. SEC, 492 F.2d 641, 645 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
217. 453 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1971).
218. Id. at 5-6.
Published219.
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In an analogous case, Sirbo Holdings, Inc. v. Commissioner,220 the
Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Friendly, directed the Tax
Court to "require the Commissioner [of Internal Revenue] to explain
and justify the different positions taken by him" in cases involving
essentially the same factual situation. 22' As one commentator has noted,
the decision "reduces the scope of the Commissioner's exclusive discretion to prosecute tax cases in the manner he chooses. "222
This brief review of recent cases upon control of prosecutors' discretionary activity should indicate that even in this area the presumption
of nonreviewability - the threshold determination that a matter or an
area is one to be insulated in toto - should not be viable. As Professor Davis has rightly observed, "Important interests are at stake.
'223
Abuses are common.
However, as has been noted throughout this article, this situation
exists in almost all areas where action is committed to agency discretion.
When important interests are at stake such as a civilian defense department employee discharged from his position, 224 a longtime resident alien
facing deportation,2 25 or any of the sundry interests reviewed in this
article the foreclosing of judicial review of agency action seems indefensible. In addition to the practical and "constitutional" difficulties
with such foreclosure, it should be clear that the Saferstein-Davis approach would often operate to frustrate Congressional intent. Judge
Tamm, in Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC,22 observed
that :
[I]f we were to foreclose review as the Commission suggests, we
would surely be condoning a frustration of congressional intent;
220. 476 F.2d 981 (2d Cir. 1973).
221. Id. at 989 n.10; see id. at 987. For a similar approach to inconsistent treatment of like-situated taxpayers, see International Bus. Mach. Corp. v. United States,
343 F.2d 914, 919-20 (Ct. Cl. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1028 (1966). Cf. Brennan
v. Gilles & Cotting, Inc., 504 F.2d 1255, 1264 (4th Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Madison
Courier, Inc., 472 F.2d 1307, 1325-26 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ; NLRB v. General Stencils,
Inc., 438 F.2d 894, 904-05 (2d Cir. 1971); FTC v. Crowther, 430 F.2d 510, 514, 516
(D.C. Cir. 1970); Marriott In-Flite Serv. v. NLRB, 417 F.2d 563, 565-66 (5th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
222. Comment, New Limitations on the Scope of Discretion of the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, 54 B.U.L. REv. 425, 430 (1974). See also id. at 440 n.57. The
decision is described as "an unprecedented exercise of judicial control over the litigational activity of the Commissioner." Id. at 430.
223. DAVIS, TREATISE, supra note 10, § 28.16, at 988. See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE:

A

PRELIMINARY INQUIRY

207-14 (1969).

224. See, e.g., Young v. United States, 498 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1974), where
the court noted that:
[T]his judicial scrutiny under the Administrative Procedure Act has been exercised in the area of federal employment despite the provision of 5 U.S.C.
§ 701 (a) (2), which make the judicial review provisions inapplicable to the extent that "agency action is committed to agency discretion by law."
Id. at 1221-22. See also note 264 infra.
225. See, e.g., Woodby v. Immigration & Natur. Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966).
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for here the petitioner asserts that the Commission is failing to
correct abuses which Congress sought to end by enacting the
statute, and that it is a member of the 2class
which Congress en7
deavored to protect in the Securities Act.1
In such a situation, the agency's actions would be final, and the barring
of review would prevent judicial consideration of issues and purposes
which Congress may have considered vital. As has been urged above,
attention to the statutory authorization becomes important. The direction of Overton Park to the statutory authority, and the difficulties described above, make very problematic the Davis-Saferstein approach of
a threshold determination of nonreviewability. Reflecting recently upon
Overton Park, Professor Schotland was moved to remark, "remember
unreviewable discretion ?,,22s

III.
A.

NONREVIEWABILITY IN

A

PARTICULAR CASE

FactorsDetermining Nonreviewability-

Saferstein'sAnalysis

In his influential article, Saferstein proposed and examined nine
factors which should be considered in reaching a determination of general nonreviewability. While the desirability of a threshold determination was rejected above,2 0 an analysis of these factors might aid a
court confronted with a facially legitimate claim of abuse of discretion in
determining the appropriateness of a finding of nonreviewability in a
particular case.23 °
The nine factors suggested by Saferstein are:
(1) broad agency discretion;
(2) expertise and experience required to understand the
subject matter of agency action;
(3) managerial nature of the agency;
(4) impropriety of judicial intervention;
(5)

necessity of informal agency decisionmaking;

(6) inability of the reviewing court to ensure a correct result
by the agency;
226. 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
227. Id. at 675. See Bachowski v. Brennan, 502 F.2d 79 (3d Cir.), cert. granted,
95 S. Ct. 654 (1974) (No. 450), where the court states: "[W]e believe judicial review
would further the general policy . . . of [the relevant statute] by ensuring that the
Secretary does not deny a remedy to those whose rights Congress sought to protect."
Id. at 85. See NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291-92 (1965) ; Davis v. Richardson, 460
F.2d 772, 775 (3d Cir. 1972) ; DeVito v. Shultz, 300 F. Supp. 381, 382 (D.D.C. 1969).
228. Schotland, supra note 94, at 122.
229. See generally section II C supra.
230. See Langevin v. Chenango Court, Inc., 447 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1971), and
the discussion
text accompanying
notes
116-22
supra,
an example
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(7) need for expeditious operation of congressional programs;
(8) quantity of potentially appealable actions;
(9) existence of other methods of preventing abuses of
discretion.

2 11

As Saferstein noted "Only in rare cases, however, is any of these factors,
standing alone, controlling; rather, their cumulative effect on the interests of the individual, the agency, and the courts determines whether
review should be denied.

232

It is not the purpose of this article to update or to extensively
criticize Saferstein's discussion. However, while each factor is worthy
of consideration by a reviewing court, his emphasis upon several areas
appears excessive.
With regard to expertise, while there are still cases which seem to
defer in the broadest fashion to any determination made by the agency
in its special field, 33 the better view would seem to be that of Professor
Jaffe, who suggested that a reviewing court "must evaluate the relevance and weight of expertness.1 23 4 Certainly expertise should not be

determinative of the question of nonreviewability in such an area as
that of procedural fairness, 235 which would seem to be uniquely within
'
a court's capacities. In an "instructive opinion," 236
Moore-McCormick
237
Lines, Inc. v. United States,
Judge Davis concluded that the Merchant Marine Act 23 ' did not cut off all judicial review of construction

subsidy awards by the Maritime Subsidy Board, 2 9 and observed that
"[e]xpertise in the agency's special substantive field is rarely, if ever,
a true prerequisite to oversight of its procedures. "240
231. Saferstein, supra note 11, at 382-95.
232. Id. at 379.
283. See, e.g., Mourning v. Family PubI. Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 371-72 (1973);
Deep Welding, Inc. v. Sciaky Bros., 417 F.2d 1227, 1234 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1037 (1970).
234. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL, supra note 12, at 579 (emphasis added). For a
similar view of agency expertise, see Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition
in the Regulated Industries: An Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67 HARV. L.
REV. 436, 471-75 (1954).
See American Shipbldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318
(1965), where the Court commented that "[t]he deference owed to an expert tribunal
cannot be allowed to slip into judicial inertia ....
"; Secretary of Labor v. Farino,
490 F.2d 885, 888-89 (7th Cir. 1973) ; Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597-98 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
235. See Saferstein, supra note 11, at 383.

236. L. JAFFE & N. NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 10 (Supp. 1972).
237. 413 F.2d 568 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
238. Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1294 (1970), as amended
(Supp. III, 1974).
239. 413 F.2d at 580.
240. Id. at 581.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/1
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Moreover, as Saferstein mentioned, "the courts may be as qualified
as a particular agency to prescribe standards and criteria, ' 24 1 as opposed
to the agency's singular ability to apply the criteria. By so functioning
a court would have the ability to oversee what Professor Lon Fuller
'242
refers to as the "congruence between official action and declared rule.
As discussed below, this process of review is one method through which
attention to congressional purposes may be enforced.243
244
In addition, insistence upon a reasoned decision by the agency
will aid oversight in an area of special competence, and provide adequate
review while minimizing judicial interference with informal agency
decisionmaking, since "requiring the agency to provide such an elabora'243
tion normally would impose only a slight burden.
As Saferstein recognized,2 4 6 the inability of a reviewing court to
ensure a "correct" result should be considered a minor factor at best.
Professor Jaffe has noted that although review of an agency's actions
might be infrequently invoked, the availability thereof might discourage
241. Saferstein, supra note 11, at 384 (emphasis added).
242. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 81 (2d ed. 1969).
243. See text accompanying notes 286-300 infra.
244. See Citizens Ass'n v. Zoning Comm'n, 477 F.2d 402 (D.C. Cir. 1973), where
Chief Judge Bazelon declared that:
[R]espect for an agency's expertise does not eliminate the need for judicial review
of agency actions, and inherent in that albeit limited power of review is the need
for an agency to spell out its reasoning.
Id. at 408.
The requirement that an agency give reasons for its decision was established
in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943). Justice Frankfurter there explained
that in order for the courts to be able to review an administrative action, they must
receive from the agency an explanation for that action. Id. at 94. Only then, he
concluded, could a court determine whether the agency had fulfilled the purpose of
the congressional delegation or had reached an erroneous decision. Id. at 94-95.
While the rule of Chenery is not a new one, courts have increasingly resorted to it
as a means to structure agency discretion. See Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Wichita
Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 805-06 (1973) ; Mower v. Britton, 504 F.2d 346, 398-99
(10th Cir. 1974) ; Bachowski v. Brennan, 502 F.2d 79, 88-89 & n.14 (3d Cir.), cert.
granted, 95 S. Ct. 654 (1974) (No. 450); American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. FPC,
494 F.2d 925, 944-45 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 148 (1974) ; Ely v. Velde,
451 F.2d 1130, 1138-39 (4th Cir. 1971) ; Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 594 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Leventhal, Principled Fairness and
Regulatory Urgency, 25 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 66, 72-73 (1974); Comment, Confining and Structuring Administrative Discretion: Environmental Defense Fund v.
Ruckelshaus, 1971 UTAH L. REv. 388. There is not, however, unanimous agreement
that the requirement that agencies supply reasons for their decisions serves a useful
purpose. See Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REv. 239 (1973),
where the author states:
I know of no solid evidence to support the belief that requiring articulation,
detailed findings or reasoned opinions enhances the integrity or propriety of
administrative decisions.
Id.
245. Saferstein, supra note 11, at 387 n.86. See United States ex rel. Harrison
v. Pace, 357 F. Supp. 354, 357 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
Published by246.
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improper agency action.247 An example is Pepsi-Cola Buffalo Bottling
Co. v. NLRB, 48 where the court invalidated a rule against relitigation
and required the NLRB to review the determinations of its regional
directors in unfair labor practice proceedings.2 49 Judge Kaufman, author
of the decision, later observed:
I must confess that we have no way of double-checking the
degree of care with which the Board will review such decisions in
the future ....
But in compelling the Board at least to confront
the case, we have, in effect, instructed it to adhere to a higher
standard of care ....
Moreover, a judicially mandated procedure
obviously has effects far beyond the immediate case. It acts as a
deterrent to unjustifiable agency action even though it may not
change the outcome in those cases already decided.25 °
Finally, although it is clear that the availability of other methods
of preventing abuses of discretion may be considered in determining
whether review is to be afforded 251 in a particular case, limitations upon
this factor must not be minimized. Professor Davis has been a strong
advocate of "rule-making as a means of confining discretion. '252 However, as Professor Arrow has pointed out, "the idea of shifting from
discretionary authority to rules is not the panacea it is sometimes alleged
to be, particularly in the realm of economic policy. 1253 Moreover, in his
report upon the results of an extensive study of the discretionary activity
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Professor Sofaer noted:
Dangerous, relatively broad and unchecked discretion may be unavoidable for any of several reasons. Standards to govern the
exercise of discretion in some circumstances may be impossible or
extremely difficult to design with sufficient specificity to offset
fears of arbitrary action. This is particularly true when a new
government program is created.254
He concluded that administrative and legislative controls are insufficient
2 5
and that the need for judicially imposed limitations is great. 1
247. See Jaffe, Judicial Review, supra note 11, at 407-08.
248. 409 F.2d 676 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969).
249. Id. at 680-81.
250. Kaufman, Judicial Review of Agency Action: A Judge's Unburdening, 45
N.Y.U.L. REV. 201, 205 (1970). See also Leventhal, supra note 180, at 526-27.
251. See Saferstein, supra note 11, at 393.
252. Davis, Postscript, supra note 10, at 833; see generally K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY, ch. 3 (1969).
253. K. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 74 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
ARROW].

For the same view,

see C.

PERROW, ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS

56 (1970).

See also Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1183,
1189-90 (1973); W. CAREY, POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES 83-84 (1967);
Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Reasoning, 3 J. LEGAL STUD.
257, 259, 268 (1974) ; Reiss, Research on Administrative Discretion and Justice, 23
J. LEGAL ED. 69, 73 (1970).
254. Sofaer, Judicial Control of Informal Discretionary Adjudication and Enforcement, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1296 (1972).
255. Id. at 1374-75.
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Factors Determining Nonreviewability in a Particular
Case - Neglected Considerations

While Saferstein fully considered the possible harmful or hampering effects of review upon the operation of the agencies, and the possible
burden upon the federal courts of entertaining these actions, much more
cursory attention is given to the individual interests involved.2 56 It is
apparent that he considered factors of administrative convenience to be
of prime importance. However, it is submitted that additional factors,
which may outweigh any decision to preclude review determined by
considering only administrative convenience, should be considered in
making any determination of review in a particular case. These additional factors have never been systematically presented, and are often
overlooked by reviewing courts. Four factors, each representing a positive function of judicial review in this area, should be balanced against
possible administrative inconvenience in making a determination of reviewability in a particular case. They are:
(1) Protection of important individual interests;
(2) Utility for proper administrative functioning;
(3) Maintenance of the legitimacy of the administrative
process;
(4) Enforcement of new public purposes.
While an exhaustive exploration of the factors is beyond the scope of
this article, a preliminary delineation is presented below. Unfortunately,
the failure of many courts to give these factors due consideration, such
failure resulting in some measure from there having never been any
systematic presentation of them, renders more than a preliminary exploration impossible.
(1)

Protection of Important Individual Interests

As has been argued throughout this article, judicial review is an
important method of controlling unauthorized agency action which
may impinge upon recognized interests.2517 This function has assumed
greater significance in recent years with the expansion of the doctrines
of standing and reviewability, and the creation of new statutory causes
of action. Thus, there should be, and upon the part of many courts.
there is a solicitude for claims of abuse or denial of important rights
or interests. Judge Friendly, in Cappadora v. Celebrezze,258 stated his
view that:
256. Cf. Saferstein, supra note 11, at 371.
257. See text accompanying notes 251-55 supra.
Published
by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1974
258. 356 F.2d 1 (2d
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Absent any evidence to the contrary, Congress may rather be presumed to have intended that the courts should fulfill their traditional role of defining and maintaining the proper bounds of administrative discretion and safeguarding the rights of the individual. 5 9
In certain areas, the protection of the important individual interests
involved should be given great weight. As the court noted in Wellford
v. Ruckelshaus, 260 "close scrutiny of administrative action is particularly
appropriate when the interests at stake are . . . personal interests in
life and health."' 261 When the very existence of the relationship of

citizen or resident is involved, the interests at stake seem equally
important.2 62
In the area of prosecutorial discretion, recourse to the courts is
often the only avenue available to protect the individuals involved from
unauthorized agency action.268 Where an arguable abuse of discretion
has interfered with the personal interest in maintaining or acquiring
government employment, review has generally been granted.264 Pro259. Id. at 6. For cases agreeing with Cappadora upon the reviewability of the
refusal to reopen the denial of disability insurance benefits under the Social Security
Act, see Maddox v. Richardson, 464 F.2d 617, 619-22 (6th Cir. 1972); Davis v.
Richardson, 460 F.2d 772, 775 (3d Cir. 1972); Chenoweth v. Weinberger, 376 F.
Supp. 1338, 1343-44 (W.D. Mo. 1974); Negron v. Secretary of Health, Educ. &
Welfare, 382 F. Supp. 913, 915 (D.P.R. 1974). Contra, Stuckey v. Weinberger, 488
F.2d 904, 909-10 (9th Cir. 1973) ; Johnson v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare,
384 F. Supp. 994, 995 (C.D. Cal. 1974). See also Bailey v. Weinberger, 419 U.S. 953
(1974), in which three justices dissented from a denial of a writ of certiorari, noting
the conflict among the circuits over this issue. Id. Justice Douglas commented that:
[T]his case presents one of the most pressing problems on the modern scene.
For the extent to which the evergrowing federal bureaucracy uses "discretion"
to mask irresponsible action that evades review seems to me to be eroding basic
rights of the citizen.
Id. at 954 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
260. 439 F.2d 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
261. Id. at 601.
262. See text accompanying note 225 supra. In Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163,
167 (1964), in which the petitioner sought a declaratory judgment that she had not
lost her American citizenship despite prolonged residence in her country of origin, the
Court stated that legislation touching the "most precious rights" of citizenship would
have to be justified "by some more urgent public necessity than substituting administrative convenience for the individual right of which the citizen is deprived." Id. at 167.
Of course, no assertion is made in this section, or elsewhere in this article, that
because important individual interests are at stake, judicial review is a requirement.
See JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL, supra note 12, at 326. It is merely a factor, albeit an
important one, to be considered.

263. See Bachowski v. Brennan, 502 F.2d 79 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct.
,659 (1974), where Judge Van Dusen commented:
To grant the Secretary [of Labor] absolute discretion in this situation seems
particularly inappropriate, for if he wrongfully refuses to file suit, individual union
members are left without a remedy.
Id. at 87-88.
264. See the incisive opinion by Judge Winter in McNeill v. Butz, 480 F.2d 314
(4th Cir. 1973) (review of dismissal of untenured federal non-civil-service enahttps://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/1
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fessor Jaffe has observed that "[t]here is quite obviously a movement
'2
in the direction of greater reviewability of military determinations, 61
probably because of the intrusion into the civilian's life which might
affect the conditions of life as a civilian. 2 " For example, the Supreme
Court has extended judicial review to protect important interests of the
individual in the recent military draft cases, 267 even when the applicable
statute seemingly precluded review.
Moreover, as Professor Arrow has pointed out, even greater than
the effect upon the specific interest of a decision precluding judicial
review is the effect
on the worth and development of the individual human beings
involved. Being subject to an authority against whom there is no
recourse leads to a loss of self-respect and an atrophy of autonomous
behavior .... 268
ploy es) ; Dozier v. United States, 473 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1973) (limited review of
removal of civil service employee of army post commissary) ; Reece v. United States,
455 F.2d 240 (9th Cir. 1972) (limiting review of failure to promote civilian employee
to patent abuses of discretion) ; Charlton v. United States, 412 F.2d 390, 393 (3d
Cir. 1969) (holding that judicial review of a Civil Service Commission dismissal of
an employee was not to be limited to determining compliance with statutory procedural requirements, but included review for abuse of discretion). Cf. Comment,
Substantive Due Process: The Extent of Public Employees' Protection From Arbitrary Dismissal, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1647 (1974).
265. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL, supra note 12, at 368.
266. Id. Courts can review military orders and other actions to determine whether
the orders were promulgated in violation of the military's own regulations, Wlite v.
Callaway, 501 F.2d 672, 674 (5th Cir. 1974); O'mara v. Zebrowzki, 447 F.2d 1085,
1087 (3d Cir. 1971); Bluth v. Laird, 435 F.2d 1065, 1071 (4th Cir. 1970) ; whether
procedures employed by the military comport with the requirements of procedural
due process; Sims v. Fox, 492 F.2d 1088, 1092 (5th Cir. 1974) ; Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201, 208-12 (2d Cir. 1972) ; and whether the military acted within the
jurisdiction conferred upon it by law, Friedman v. Froehlke, 470 F.2d 1351, 1353 (1st
Cir. 1972); Caruso v. Toothaker, 331 F. Supp. 294, 296-97 (M.D. Pa. 1971). For
further discussion of permissible court review of military authority decisions, see
Hoersch v. Froehlke, 382 F. Supp. 1235, 1238 n.21 (E.D. Pa. 1974), and cases cited
therein. See also Kurlan v. Callaway, 510 F.2d 274, 280 (2d Cir. 1974) ; Duhon v.
United States, 461 F.2d 1278, 1281 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
267. See Breen v. Selective Serv. Bd., 396 U.S. 460 (1970); Oestereich vSelective Serv. Bd., 393 U.S. 233 (1968). Cf. Manges v. Camp, 474 F.2d 97, 99
(5th Cir. 1973).
268. ARRow, supra note 253, at 73. Cf. United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman,
N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.), judgment vacated, 95 S. Ct. 488
(1974), where the court, in reviewing parole release determinations and requiring,
a statement of reasons, stated:
Besides breeding needless frustration, hatred, cynicism and disrespect for government institutions, the Board's failure to give reasons often induces feelings of
hopelessness or despondency which lead inmates no longer to care about making
any effort to improve themselves.
Id. at 933. See also Comment, Curbing Abuse in the Decision to Grant or Deny
Parole, 8 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS - Civ. LIa. L. REV. 419, 429-30, 458 (1973). Idat 406-07.
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(2) Utility for Proper Adminisirative Functioning
Professors Gelihorn and Byse have commented that "[n]otwithstanding its admittedly restricted role and other recognized limitations,
judicial review is an important deterrent to administrative excesses."2 69
Particularly in those instances where discretion is held to be unreviewable the possibility of administrative abuse is more substantial. In
Holmes v. New York 'ity Housing Authority,"' the court stated:
"It need hardly be said that the existence of an absolute and uncontrolled
discretion in an agency of government vested with the administration.
of a vast program . . .would be an intolerable invitation to abuse.""'

The need to limit or control discretion was confirmed in Professor
Sofaer's extensive study of discretionary activity at the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS).2 Although never considered by
Saferstein, this possible positive effect of judicial review should not be
ignored by a reviewing court. Professor Sofaer outlined the positive
effects review would have upon the discretionary activity of the INS:
Judicial review based on a principle that allowed changes and
exception-making, but insisted that they be rationally explicable,
would probably aid rather than hinder regulation at INS. It
would force greater articulation of policy, provide agency personnel
with rules to use as shields against improper pressure, and possibly
lead to more stable decisions and less costly administration.
Similarly, in discussing the import of Sirbo Holdings, Inc. v.
Commissioner,274 one commentator has suggested that:

Clarification of seemingly conflicting policy positions [as directed
in Sirbo] will save the [Internal Revenue Service] a substantial
amount of resources presently expended on prosecution evolving
269. W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, supra note 55, at 144.
270. 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968).
271. Id. at 265. See Leeds & Northrup Co. v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 527, 531-32 (3d
Cir. 1966); Klanke v. Camp, 320 F. Supp. 1185, 1187 (S.D. Tex. 1970). See also
Berger, Reply, supra note 13, where the author states: "[I]n practical effect, unreviewable discretion permits administrators to abuse it." Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
272. Sofaer, supra note 254, at 1295. For a similar conclusion in a different
context see Rabin, Preclusion of Judicial Review in the Processing of Veterans'
Benefits: A Preliminary Analysis, 27 STAN. L. Rav. 905, 917 (1975).
273. Id. at 1356. For an illustration of the problems created by standardless
decisionmaking, see NLRB v. Longshoremen's Union, Local 50, 504 F.2d 1209, 1219-21
,(9th Cir. 1974). In such circumstances, a reviewing court can be helpful in resolving
,doubts and uncertainties for all parties, including the agency.
See Jaffe, Judicial Review, supra note 11:
Anyone familiar with modern delegations knows that there is a large area of
legitimate doubt and dispute. Within that area, the good administrator's leverage
is enhanced and his conscience justifiably eased if he does not have the last word
,on legality.
274. 476 F.2d 981 (2d Cir. 1973).
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from the practice of bringing
suits founded on inconsistent inter2 75
pretations of the Code.

Another positive effect stemming from review might be to provide
a check against the "likelihood of unnecessary error" based upon "the
overload of information and decisionmaking capacity of the authority."'2 76 As a complex organization, the administrative agency often

cannot be aware of all that is relevant, and review may serve to allow
the smoother functioning of the agency in a way entailing little disruption.
(3) Maintenance of the Legitimacy of the Administrative Process
Frequently overlooked is the effect of the decision to grant or refuse
judicial review upon the legitimacy of the entire administrative process.
In certain instances, denial of review could be most detrimental not only
to the specific individuals involved, but also the entire community.
Professor Jaffe has maintained that "[t]he availability of judicial
review is the necessary condition, psychologically if not logically, of a
system of administrative power which purports to be legitimate or
legally valid. ' 277 Many administrative actions or refusals to act can
275. Comment, supra note 222, at 445.
276. ARROW, supra note 253, at 73-74.
277. Jaffe, Judicial Review, supra note 12, at 401. The existence of a legitimacyconferring power by courts has been increasingly discussed, usually in reference to
the effect of particular decisions of the Supreme Court. Accord, C. BLACK, THE
PEOPLE AND THE COURT 52, 56-86 (1960); BICKEL, supra note 124, at 29; Deutsch,
Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between Law
and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169, 198-99, 207 (1968) ; Karst & Horowitz,
Presidential Prerogative and Judicial Review, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 47, 52 (1974).
Contra, M.

SHAPIRO, THE SUPREME COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE

AGENCIES

264-65

(1968); Adamany, Legitimacy, Realigning Elections, and the Supreme Court, 1973
Wis. L. REV. 790. In his powerful critique, Professor Adamany stresses that none
of the commentators considered "advances any factual support for the Supreme Court's
legitimacy-conferring capacity .

. . ."

Adamany, supra, at 843. But see Casey, The

Supreme Court and Myth: An Empirical Investigation, 8 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 385,
411 (1974) ; cf. also the articles by Kessel and Dolbeare in THE IMPACT OF SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS 187-209 (T. Becker & M. Feeley eds. 2d ed. 1973).
While research in this area is still in its initial stages, I suggest that a useful
distinction might be made between the legitimacy-conferring capacity of particular
decisions of a court (apparently Adamany's concern), and the legitimacy added to
the administrative process by the very availability of review of agency action perceived to be unauthorized or unfair. The existence of a potential forum for redress
represented by the courts, and the opportunity to at least be heard should this forum
be resorted to, should prove even more significant as areas of governmental regulation
continue to expand.
The distinction offered is somewhat analogous to that in political science
between the study of decisions and nondecisions. See Bachrach & Baratz, Decisions
and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework, 57 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 632 (1963);
Bachrach & Baratz, Two Faces of Power, 56 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 947 (1962);
Deutsch, supra at 251-52, 254-55. For an excellent empirical study, see M. CRENSON,
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital
Repository, 1974
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stir great resentment, and the absence of any opportunity for judicial
review by a seemingly impartial tribunal may exacerbate this feeling.
Alternatively, a finding of nonreviewability might encourage apathy in
the face of apparent manipulation by an impersonal bureaucracy."'
As Jaffe observes:
From the point of view of the agency, the question of the legitimacy
of its action is secondary to that of the positive solution of a problem. It is for this reason that we, in common with nearly all of the
Western countries, have concluded that the maintenance of legitimacy requires a judicial body independent of the active adminis2 9
tration. 1
A related aspect of the legitimacy issue is the effect that official
illegality has upon the people's perceptions of their government. The
late Herbert Packer commented upon the importance of providing some
sort of review, noting that "[w]hen victims of discriminatory enforcement see what is happening, secondary effects subversive of respect
for law . . . are produced." 8 ' Review would counteract these effects
in many cases, and also would serve as a mechanism for alleviating
some of the rigid and impersonal aspects of administration, simply by
allowing the petitioner's grievances to be aired and his viewpoints considered,2 81 thus providing "a constant source of assurance and security
'282
to the citizens.

THE UN-POLITICS OF AIR POLLUTION:
CITIES

A

STUDY OF NoN-DECISIONMAKING

IN

THE

(1971).

278. Professor Fuller has pointed out that in the United States, the judiciary is
responsible for maintaining a "congruence between official action and declared rule."
FULLER, supra note 242, at 81. See National Auto. Laund. & Clean. Council v. Shultz,
443 F.2d 689, 695 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ; JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL, supra note 12, at 324.
279. JafTe, Judicial Review, supra note 12, at 405. See Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v.
Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 807 (1973), where the Court referred to its
responsibility "to guarantee the integrity of the administrative process."; Hogg,
Judicial Review: How Much Do We Need?, 20 McGILL L.J..15Y (1974):
The very qualities which make the agency well suited to determine questions
within its area of specialization may lead it to overlook or underestimate general
values which are fundamental to the legal order as a whole. The generalist
Court is ideally suited to check the specialist Agency at the point where those
general values are threatened.
Id. at 164.

280. H.

PACKER,

THE

LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION

290 (1968).

281. In the area of labor law, the Supreme Court, in United Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960), recognized the "therapeutic" effect of submitting even a facially frivolous claim to arbitration. Id. at 568. In other areas of
law the judiciary performs a similar task. Faced with a dispute in which an administrative agency is a party, a court should not ignore its capacity to perform a palliative
function when determining whether review should be granted.
282. Jaffe, Judicial Review, supra note 12, at 408.
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It is submitted that the availability of judicial review helps legitimize and maintain respect for the administrative process itself. As
Judge Leventhal pointed out in Greater Boston Television Corp. v.
FCC,28 there is a broad interest in "enabling the public to repose confidence in the process as well as in the judgments of its decisionmakers.

'2 8 4

While the contribution of the availability of review to the

legitimacy of the administrative process is an intangible factor, and as
such is often ignored or devalued in decisionmaking, 8 5 its importance
should not be minimized in any determination as to reviewability.
(4) Enforcement of New Public Purposes
In recent years, several decisions - notably those emanating from
the District of Columbia Circuit - have discussed the "partnership"
of the judicial system with the agencies in the administrative process.
For example, in Greater Boston Television Corp., Judge Leventhal
stated that there is, in the review process,
an awareness that agencies and courts together constitute a
"partnership" in furtherance of the public interest, and are "collaborative instrumentalities of justice." The court is in a real
sense part of the total administrative process ....""
A prime motivating factor behind the advancement of this partnership theory is that it enables a court to supplement the aims of the
agencies. Utilizing an informed sense of judgment as to the movement
283. 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
284. Id. at 852. See generally Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal
Processes - A Plea for "Process Values," 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1974); Tribe,
Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV.
1329, 1391-92 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Trial by Mathematics]; Tribe, Technology
Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of Instrumental Rationality, 46
S. CAL. L. REv. 617, 630-33 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Technology Assessment].
285. See the discussion of the "dwarfing of soft variables" in Tribe, Trial by
Mathematics, supra note 284, at 1361-65. He notes that:
Readily quantifiable factors are easier to processand hence more likely to be
recognized and then reflected in the outcome - than are factors that resist ready
quantification. The result, despite what turns out to be a spurious appearance
of accuracy and completeness, is likely to be significantly warped and hence
highly suspect.
Id. at 1362. See also Tribe, Technology Assessment, supra note 284, at 625-30.
See, e.g., Scenic Hudson Pres. Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 623 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966), and the discussion of this case in Reich,
supra note 2, at 1248-51. See also id. at 1264-65.
286. 444 F.2d at 851-52. Professor Schotland considered this opinion to be "the
best and wisest statement of the relationship between courts and administrators .
Schotland, supra note 94, at 126-27.
Professor Shapiro puts forward the view that "the courts and the administrative bureaucracy ought to be considered as two parallel structures for the administration of government programs." SHAPIRO, supra note 277, at 44. See Karst &
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and purposes of public policy in an area of the law, a court, through
judicial review, might pressure an agency to consider newer national
goals (exemplified, for example, in supplementary legislation, or in
legislation having a bearing on the agency's traditional functions) in
the decisionmaking process. 87
Professor Jaffe has been averse to "a legal philosophy which insists
on completely rigid roles, which stifles and discourages creative ex'
pression and interchange between the judges and the executive." 288
An
example of such stratification would be a court's dereliction in its responsibility to consider whether or not proper attention is being paid to new
congressional policies. The courts, however, have increasingly moved
in the direction of supplementation through the review process. The
concern of the Supreme Court that the newly announced purpose of
protecting public parks was not being adequately considered seemed to
2 9
be an important aspect of the decision in Overton Park.
" Similarly,
2
9
°
the court in Wellford v. Ruckelshaus remanded in part because the
Secretary of Agriculture may have failed, contrary to the relevant
statute's direction, to assign sufficient importance to the risk of harm
to human lives in his refusal to ban federal registration of a certain
herbicide. 29 1 Other recent decisions also have attempted to impress
upon specialized agencies their responsibility to incorporate various
broad national policies into their decisionmaking processes.29 2
In the leading decision interpreting the National Environmental
Policy Act of 196929 (NEPA), Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. Atomic Energy Commission,294 judge Wright commented:

287. See Comment, supra note 56, where the author states: "The basic idea is
simply that the courts monitor the administrative process to insure that the substantive objectives which Congress seeks to achieve through administrative action are
achieved in fact." Id. at 692.
288. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL, supra note 12, at 326.
289. See 401 U.S. at 412-13.
290. 439 F.2d 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
291. Id. at 602-03.
292. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. CAB, 502 F.2d 453, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
where the court noted that transportation agencies like the CAB have a responsibility to make decisions consistent with national labor policy; National Ass'n of
Indep. Tel. Producers & Distribs. v. FCC, 502 F.2d 249, 256 (2d Cir. 1974), where
the court noted that the FCC must incorporate the nation's policy favoring competition in regulating the broadcast media. See also Martin-Trigona v. Federal Reserve
Bd., 509 F.2d 363, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
The courts may also be helpful by ratifying and encouraging agency attempts
to implement new national policies, often over the opposition of previously favored
groups. See, e.g., Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 211-14 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 910 (1971), a review under the National Environmental Policy Act upholding the Secretary of the Army's refusal to authorize a project for ecological reasons.
Zabel is noted in 16 VILL. L. REv. 766, 777-78 (1971).
293. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-37 (1970).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/1
294. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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[I]t remains to be seen whether the promise of this legislation
will become a reality. Therein lies the judicial role .... Our duty,
in short, is to see that important legislative purposes, heralded in
the halls of Congress, are not lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy.2 95
Many cases have arisen under the NEPA where judicial attention
has been focused upon the agency's responsibility to take environmental
values into account in the process of decisionmaking.2 6 These decisions
reflect the judiciary's awareness that NEPA "is intended to interrupt
business-as-usual and to affect the decisionmaking process at the lowest
agency level,"" 7 and its efforts to impress this new public policy objective upon often recalcitrant agencies.2 9 Dean Cramton and Berg have
observed that the "willingness of courts to vindicate environmental
values means that governmental agencies must take seriously the NEPA
295. Id. at 1111.
296. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 829 (5th Cir. 1975); Minnesota
Pub. Int. Res. Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1319-20 (8th Cir. 1974) ; Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 492 F.2d 1123, 1139-40 (5th Cir. 1974) ; Sierra
Club v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d 946, 951-53 (7th Cir. 1973) ; Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282,
1283 (1st Cir. 1973); Conservation Council v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664, 665 (4th Cir.
1973) ; Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 297-300
(8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973) ; Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, at 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. TVA, 492 F.2d 466, 468 (6th Cir. 1974), aff'g 371 F.
Supp. 1004, 1013 (E.D. Tenn. 1973). The courts, however, are not unanimous in their
view as to what the proper scope of review should be. Some limit review to a determination of whether the NEPA's procedural requirements have been met. See, e.g.,
Sierra Club v. Stamm, 507 F.2d 788, 793 (10th Cir. 1974); Trout Unlimited v.
Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1282 (9th Cir. 1974); Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677,
692-93 (9th Cir. 1974).
To consider NEPA as essentially procedural, as Lathan explicitly did (see
506 F.2d at 623), would appear to ensure less effective control over the degree to
which these new values are being taken into account in the process of decisionmaking. For further discussion of judicial review under NEPA, see Briggs, NEPA
as a Means to Preserve and Improve the Environment -- The Substantive Review,
15 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 699, 716-17, 719 (1974); Cohen & Warren, Judicial
Recognition of the Substantive Requirements of the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, 13 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 685, 686-87, 691-95, 701-02 (1972);
Cramton & Berg, On Leading a Horse to Water: NEPA and the Federal Bureaucracy, 71 MIcH. L. REV. 511, 534-36 (1973) ; Jaffe, Ecological Goals and the Ways
and Means of Achieving Them, 75 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 27-29 (1972); Leventhal,
supra note 180, at 512-18; Yarrington, Judicial Review of Substantive Agency
Decisions: A Second Generation of Cases Under the National Environmental Policy
Act, 19 S.D.L. REV. 279, 285-90, 293-94 (1974) ; Note, Substantive Review Under the
National Environmental Policy Act: EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 3 EcoLOGY L.Q. 173,
181-87, 208 (1973); Note, The Least Adverse Alternative Approach to Substantive
Review Under NEPA, 88 HARV. L. REV. 735, 738-44, 756-58 (1975).
297. Scenic Rivers Ass'n v. Lynn, 382 F. Supp. 69, 75 (E.D. Okla. 1974).
298. One commentator has suggested that the number of actions will be reduced
as the procedural requirements of NEPA are mastered and as the agencies "develop
an institutional stake in consideration of environmental values ....
" Note, Evolving
Judicial Standards under the National Environmental Policy Act and the Challenge
of the Alaskan Pipeline, 81 YALE L.J. 1592, 1639 n.221 (1972).
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obligation to consider environmental factors and the views of out'
siders." 299
Nor is it surprising that the concept of partnership, which gives
the courts a more active role in the administrative process, has been
so prominent in environmental decisions, for it is in that area that
new statutory policies and public concerns have faced a difficult period
of accommodation, and have not been readily accepted by the many
agencies affected by them; some of them having had differing and
often apparently inconsistent purposes."' 0 Yet it is just this sort of
frontier area in which the fourth positive factor should be given weight
by a reviewing court.
CONCLUSION

The rejection of nonreviewability as a threshold determination was
dictated by a recognition of the great need for review to protect the
individual, the administrative process itself, and new public purposes,
as well as by an appreciation of the practical and constitutional difficulties with acceptance of such an approach. An attempt has been made
to outline four additional factors to be balanced against the administrative convenience factors proposed by Saferstein,8 01 when making the
determination of reviewability in a particular case.
The position taken here is that foreclosure of judicial review as a
means of aiding administrative "convenience" is inapt. The view urging
convenience as a paramount virtue is not only too narrow, since it does
not consider the four factors outlined above; it may also attack the problem from the wrong end. Emphasis should be placed upon efforts to
improve quality and efficiency in other areas of the administrative
process in addition to providing rather than foreclosing review. The
removal or redesign of the many unwieldy and overly complicated

299. Cramton & Berg, supra note 296, at 517. See Note, The Least Adverse
Alternative Approach to Substantive Review Under NEPA, supra note 294, at 757.
The openness of the judiciary to the arguments of the often ephemeral
coalitions which support newer goals, and the judiciary's willingness to insert itself
more explicitly into the administrative process, will be an important factor in determining the degree to which newer goals will be taken into account by established
agencies. This is particularly the case in this area since, as Professor Jaffe has
noted, "the great limitation . . . of the administrative process is that in many cases
it is unrepresentative," with "[p]ermanently organized groups . . . overrepresented."

Jaffe, supra note 296, at 20.
300. See id. at 514. See generally Jaffe, The Administrative Agency and Environmental Control, 20 BUFFALO L. Rav. 231, 235-36 (1971).

301. See text accompanying note 231 supra.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/1
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bureaucractic procedures in government programs would serve both
the agencies 2 and the individuals affected by them. It should be
remembered that the availability of judicial review is a necessary,
but certainly not a sufficient condition for legitimate and effective
administrative functioning. As Professor Summers has recently suggested, some kinds of abuse of discretion can be traced directly or
indirectly to deficiencies in process design." 3"' These problems which
result in abuse of discretion stem from internal shortcomings of the
administrative process and have only been tangentially dealt with herein,
from the standpoint of the ameliorative effect that judicial review has
upon them. It is hoped that lack of preoccupation with this issue is not
mistakenly construed as a relegation of it to secondary importance." 4
The stress throughout this article has been upon the statutory
mandate to the agency - the scope of discretion granted to it by
Congress. As Professor Berger has commented, "[i]t is difficult to
read

. .

. 'committed to agency discretion' as if it included authority to

'abuse' discretion."

'

The thrust of this article has been to demonstrate
that it need not, and should not, be so read.

302. It is submitted that there are other areas which could be corrected with less
adverse effects upon important values. See also the conclusion of Professor Schotland that:
To speak of delay as bad and therefore rush to limit judicial revie* is . . .to
ignore how much of the delay which is blamed on judicial review is actually
cawted by failures or slowness elsewhere ....
Schotland, supra note 94, at 128. Cf. NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S.
258 (1969), for a case of bureaucratic delay in decisionmaking (delay of over 5 years
by NLRB in making back pay specification). The Court stated that in certain instances of agency delay, action could be compelled under § 706(1). Id. at 266 & n.3.
See also Columbus Brdcstg. Coalition v. FCC, 505 F.2d 320, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
There has been, however, a paucity of studies of the implementation of public
programs by government agencies. The most valuable is J. PRESSMAN & A. WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION (1973), an illuminatitg case study ci the failure of the
Economic Development Administration's employment effort in Oakland, California.
303. Summers, supra note 284, at 11.
304. I am not unmindful of Judge Friendly's reflection that most students of
administrative law are more concerned "with what the courts do with the agencies
than with what the agencies do with themselves." H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 173-74 (1962).
See also Cramton & Berg, supra note
296, who note that while "NEPA is a constant pressure in the right direction . . .it
cannot in itself provide the organizational structure or the intelligence and judgment
that are prerequisites to needed change . . . ." Id. at 596; Denvir, Controlling Welfare
Bureaucracy: A Dynamic Approach, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 457, 458 (1975).

Charles Reich has suggested, as a means of "institutionalizing certain values
which might otherwise be neglected," adding special interest bureaus to a department,
thereby "underwrit[ing] pluralism" within a particular bureaucracy. Reich, supra
note 2, at 1262-63. Such structural alterations might be very successful to the extent
that the institutional processes discussed by Cramton & Berg, supra note 296, at
515-17, are operative. But see Sax, supra note 244, at 245-46.
305. Berger,
Arbitrariness,
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noteof13,
61. Repository, 1974
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